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Dissecting Arbitrage Costs 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper systematically examines the impact of nine popular arbitrage costs measures on cross-
sectional mispricing based on ten well-known and robust anomalies. We show that binding 
arbitrage barriers slowly change over time. In early years with few publications documenting 
return anomalies, arbitrage costs have tiny impact even though mispricing is present. As anomalies 
become more widely known, arbitrage costs impact mispricing substantially. Arbitrage risk, 
ambiguity of fundamental value, round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads, and stock 
loan supply are binding on arbitrageurs. Only arbitrage risk is binding if larger cap stocks are 
emphasized. In recent years when market quality improves and some arbitrageurs become more 
creative, only round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads and stock loan supply remain 
binding on arbitrageurs. If larger cap stocks are emphasized, arbitrage costs do not matter at all 
because there is no longer mispricing. An empirical arbitrage costs model based on these simple 
dynamics subsumes annually-varying principal components of arbitrage costs in affecting 
mispricing. Incorporating our findings into future capital market efficiency research would 
mitigate type I and II errors in empirical tests applying the limits-to-arbitrage argument. 
 
JEL Classification: G12; G14 
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1. Introduction 
Proper functioning of and efficiency in the financial markets not only require sufficient 
capital flows to arbitrageurs (Akbas, Armstrong, Sorescu, and Subrahmanyam, 2016), but also 
depends on the effectiveness of carrying out arbitrage trades. Heightened arbitrage costs generally 
lessen incentives to eliminate mispricing in a timely manner desired by perfect capital markets 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gromb and Vayanos, 2010). This limits-to-arbitrage theory, which 
predicts anomalies to be stronger when arbitrage costs are higher, formulates a main test in capital 
market efficiency research. An expanding body of empirical studies of anomalies in the cross 
section of average stock returns has reached a consensus for this argument.1 However, papers use 
different measures of arbitrage costs and most of them involve individual anomalies or a set of 
similar anomalies. Besides, this literature does not address which of the arbitrage costs constitutes 
the most important barrier to arbitrage activity. 
In this paper, we perform a systematic investigation on nine arbitrage costs measures that 
have strong theoretical motivations and large amounts of data, and are reliable and commonly used 
in the anomalies literature. These measures are idiosyncratic stock return volatility, cash flow 
volatility, analyst earnings forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, share price, dollar trading volume, 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity, effective bid-ask spread, and passive institutional ownership. To begin, 
we construct an overall arbitrage costs score from the nine measures. We establish the impact of 
overall arbitrage costs on extent of cross-sectional mispricing. Like the relative valuation approach 
in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012, 2015), mispricing is identified by a misprice score comprised 
of ten well-known and robust anomalies in the cross section of stock returns. The anomaly 
                                                
1 Notable papers include Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006), Zhang 
(2006), Duan, Hu, and McLean (2010), Li and Zhang (2010), McLean (2010), Lam and Wei (2011), Lipson, Mortal, 
and Schill (2011), Cao and Han (2015), Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), Li and Lou (2016), and Yan and Zheng 
(2017). 
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variables involved are total asset growth, investment-to-assets ratio, net operating assets, operating 
accruals, net share issuance, composite share issuance, Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy score, gross 
profitability, operating profitability, and prior-year stock return. Some of these variables are 
negatively correlated with future abnormal returns (e.g., total asset growth) while others are 
positively correlated with future abnormal returns (e.g., gross profitability). Since at least one 
arbitrage costs measure or anomaly variable is required in constructing a score, our sample size 
remains large even though we study multiple arbitrage costs measures and anomalies. We sort 
stocks by mispricing and examine how equal- and value-weighted three-factor alphas (Fama and 
French, 1993) on short-leg, long-leg, and long-short portfolios vary with overall arbitrage costs.2 
We also estimate interactive cross-sectional regressions to assess the impact of overall arbitrage 
costs on mispricing. 
We split the nine arbitrage costs measures into three groups, namely arbitrage risk 
(idiosyncratic stock return volatility), information uncertainty (cash flow volatility, analyst 
earnings forecast dispersion, and analyst coverage), and transaction costs (share price, dollar 
trading volume, Amihud (2002) illiquidity, effective bid-ask spread, and passive institutional 
ownership), and we construct a score for each group. Arbitrage risk refers to firm-specific price 
movements, which are difficult for arbitrageurs to hedge (e.g., Pontiff, 1996, 2006; Cao and Han, 
2015). Information uncertainty captures ambiguity of a stock’s intrinsic or fundamental value, 
disagreement in future earnings among market participants, and information asymmetry in the 
stock’s information environment (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Zhang, 2006). Transaction 
costs measure expenses and technical difficulties in entering and exiting arbitrage positions such 
                                                
2 Equal- and value-weighted monthly alphas on long-short portfolio based on quintiles of the misprice score are 0.91% 
(t-statistics = 8.61) and 0.66% (t-statistics = 5.58), respectively. These anomalous returns are comparable to those 
(0.69% (t-statistics = 6.44) and 0.50% (t-statistics = 3.35)) on long-short portfolio based on the fundamental-analysis 
quintiles Bartram and Grinblatt (2017) construct with market equity and 28 Compustat accounting items. 
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as round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads, liquidity, price impact, compensation for 
liquidity provision, and stock loan supply for short selling (e.g., Nagel, 2005; Novy-Marx and 
Velikov, 2015). We examine not only the impact of each group on mispricing individually, but 
also their impact jointly. To perform the joint investigation, we estimate interactive cross-sectional 
regressions of stock returns on the misprice score, arbitrage risk, the information uncertainty score, 
and the transaction costs score. 
The overall arbitrage costs score, arbitrage risk, the information uncertainty score, and the 
transaction costs score always equally weight their components. To allow for time variation in 
relative informativeness of the nine arbitrage costs measures, we perform principal components 
analysis on the measures annually. The arbitrage costs space statistically stably reduces to three 
dimensions over time. On average, the first principal component is positively associated with 
idiosyncratic stock return volatility, cash flow volatility, effective bid-ask spread, and passive 
institutional ownership, and it is negatively associated with analyst coverage, share price, and 
dollar trading volume. The second principal component is positively associated with idiosyncratic 
stock return volatility, cash flow volatility, analyst coverage, dollar trading volume, and effective 
bid-ask spread, and it is negatively associated with passive institutional ownership. The third 
principal component is positively associated with analyst earnings forecast dispersion. We 
examine the impact of each of the three annually-varying principal components on mispricing 
individually as well as their impact jointly. 
Moreover, we examine jointly the impact of the nine arbitrage costs measures on mispricing 
across three salient periods in the literature of return anomalies. We conveniently refer to these 
subperiods as the “pre-discovery period”, the “golden age of mispricing”, and the “attenuation 
period”. The first subperiod is mainly motivated by the start of the anomalies literature. For 
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example, only two of the 97 anomalies on the McLean and Pontiff (2016) list are published during 
this subperiod. Mispricing is well-known to be strong during the “golden age of mispricing”. The 
third subperiod is motivated by Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2014), who show that many 
anomalies attenuate towards zero around mid 2000s. 
Portfolio and regression results from the U.S. sample covering monthly stock returns from 
07/1963 to 12/2015 show that overall arbitrage costs explain a large portion of anomalous returns 
in the cross section. For example, value-weighted alpha on long-short portfolio based on the 
misprice score drops by 65% when we move from high to low overall arbitrage costs quintile. A 
much larger part of the alpha reduction comes from short-leg than from long-leg of the trading 
strategy. 
Portfolio results indicate that arbitrage risk, information uncertainty, and transaction costs 
are individually important. The impact on short leg is larger than on long leg not only for arbitrage 
risk, but also for information uncertainty and transaction costs. The asymmetric short- versus long-
position concern put forward by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) goes beyond the arbitrage costs 
represented by idiosyncratic stock return volatility.3 Regression results show that all three arbitrage 
costs groups individually impact mispricing, except information uncertainty when larger cap 
stocks are emphasized. When the three arbitrage costs groups are investigated jointly, they all 
impact mispricing and yet the effect of transaction costs is the weakest. Furthermore, when we 
emphasize larger cap stocks, information uncertainty and transaction costs are redundant because 
only arbitrage risk matters. 
                                                
3 Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) document that mutual funds have low use of actual shorting due to 
investment policy restrictions. Furthermore, Hong and Sraer (2016) argue that short-sale impediments are prevalent 
because capital engaged in short selling, such as hedge funds, is tiny compared to capital not actively engaged in short 
selling, such as mutual funds.  
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Results from portfolios and regressions indicate that the first and second annually-varying 
principal components of arbitrage costs impact mispricing in a manner consistent with the limits-
to-arbitrage argument. However, the third principal component does not. These findings are the 
same when the principal components are investigated individually and jointly. 
Joint investigation of the nine arbitrage costs measures across subperiods show that the 
barriers slowing down correction of mispricing change over time. In early years when scientific 
knowledge on return anomalies is scarce (07/1963 to 06/1983), arbitrage costs have very little 
impact on mispricing despite its presence.4 As anomalies become more widely known (07/1983 to 
12/2004), mispricing remains strong but arbitrage costs have substantial impact on the extent of 
mispricing. Arbitrage risk (idiosyncratic stock return volatility), ambiguity of fundamental value 
(cash flow volatility), round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads (share price), and stock 
loan supply (passive institutional ownership) are binding on arbitrageurs. Only arbitrage risk 
matters if we emphasize larger cap stocks. In recent years when market quality improves and 
arbitrage strategy becomes more creative (01/2005 to 12/2015), mispricing is much weaker. Only 
round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads and stock loan supply remain binding on 
arbitrageurs. If we emphasize larger cap stocks, arbitrage costs do not matter at all because there 
is no longer mispricing. 
Although the slow time variations in binding arbitrage costs we uncover might look simple, 
they are in fact practical: an empirical arbitrage costs model based on these simple dynamics 
subsumes the first and second annually-varying principal components of arbitrage costs in 
affecting mispricing. The subperiod findings also indicate that the joint impact of three arbitrage 
                                                
4 A change of variance analysis during the 1980s detects a breakpoint at 05/1983 on the time series of value-weighted 
alphas on long-short portfolio based on the misprice score. Limited by data availability, the principal components of 
arbitrage costs begin at 06/1983. We break at 06/1983 in order to compare an empirically motivated arbitrage costs 
model with the statistically oriented annually-varying principal components of arbitrage costs in affecting mispricing. 
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costs groups on mispricing we document from the entire sample period are specific to the “golden 
age of mispricing”. The impact of arbitrage risk and the impact information uncertainty, mainly in 
the form of ambiguity of fundamental value, have largely disappeared while transaction costs, 
mainly in terms of round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads and stock loan supply, 
remain binding on arbitrageurs in recent years. Ambiguity of fundamental value might have 
become less important in recent years because young ventures from the dot-com period have aged. 
Our findings also echo Ljungqvist and Qian (2016), who report that increasing number of creative 
arbitrageurs recently practice an information disclosure strategy designed to circumvent noise 
trader risk.5 
Our empirical results fit into the literature on limits to arbitrage and anomalies. Early work 
establishes positive correlations between arbitrage costs and individual anomalies or a set of 
similar anomalies. For example, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) study the book-to-market 
anomaly, Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006) study the accruals anomaly, Zhang (2006) 
study price momentum, Duan, Hu, and McLean (2010) study the short interest anomaly, Li and 
Zhang (2010) study capital investment anomalies, McLean (2010) study price momentum and 
reversal, Lam and Wei (2011) and Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2011) study the asset growth 
anomaly, and Li and Lou (2016) study the cash holdings anomaly. Although emerging papers go 
further to involve multiple anomalies (e.g., Cao and Han, 2015; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015; 
Yan and Zheng, 2017), they either focus only on arbitrage risk represented by idiosyncratic stock 
return volatility or study some arbitrage costs measures that are quite arbitrarily chosen. Even 
though this literature reaches an agreement that limits to arbitrage are crucial for mispricing, an 
                                                
5 The arbitrage strategy begins by shorting an overpriced stock. Instead of hedging the position and quietly wait for 
price convergence, arbitrageurs actively release private information on overvaluation to persuade existing 
shareholders to sell their holdings in order to accelerate price discovery and prevent adverse price movements (e.g., 
Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990). 
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open question remains: which of the various arbitrage costs constitute the most crucial arbitrage 
barrier? This question is important because empirical tests using arbitrarily chosen measures might 
produce misleading conclusions. 
We are the first to systematically study an extensive list of popular arbitrage costs measures 
and anomalies.6 Like other papers, our extensive results largely support the limits-to-arbitrage 
story that mispricing is stronger when arbitrage costs are higher. Unlike other papers, we are able 
to sort out which of the arbitrage costs constitute the most important arbitrage barriers by pitting 
arbitrage costs variables against one another and examine their impact on mispricing. 
Our findings have fundamental implications for empirical capital market efficiency research 
that applies the limits-to-arbitrage argument in analyzing anomalies. First, using an arbitrary 
basket of arbitrage costs measures would overstate the amount of evidence for the mispricing 
explanation for an anomaly or against the null of rational pricing, and it also provides mistaken 
interpretations. For example, arbitrage risk is the only arbitrage costs that matter for larger cap 
stocks. Due to correlations between idiosyncratic stock return volatility, share price, dollar trading 
volume, illiquidity, and effective bid-ask spread, supportive evidence obtained from these 
transaction costs measures and value-weighted returns are redundant. These results also lead to the 
false conclusion that transaction costs themselves are important for an anomaly and large firms. 
Second, using conventional sample of monthly returns starting from 07/1963 would overstate 
the scope of evidence for the mispricing explanation for an anomaly or against the null of rational 
pricing. For example, arbitrage risk affects anomalous returns on larger cap stocks from 07/1983 
to 12/2004. A study finding supportive evidence from arbitrage risk and value-weighted returns 
                                                
6 Our objective is to dissect which arbitrage costs matter for mispricing. We do not aim to test whether limits to 
arbitrage completely explain cross-sectional anomalies. 
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for the period 07/1963 to 12/2015 provides the wrong perception that the evidence is based on 
more than 53 years of history even though the results are significant for just about 22 years. 
Third, using ineffective arbitrage costs measures would ran a chance of falsely declining the 
mispricing explanation for an anomaly in favor of the null of rational pricing. For example, using 
equal-weighted returns and only arbitrage risk for a period starting around mid 2000s might not 
produce any evidence for the mispricing explanation but using round-trip broker’s commission 
plus bid-ask spreads and loan stock supply might. 
We proceed as follows. The next section reviews the nine arbitrage costs measures. Section 
3 describes the misprice score. Section 4 describes our data and presents summary statistics. 
Section 5 reports empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the study and provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Arbitrage Costs 
Abnormal profit in a mispriced stock attracts arbitrageurs to correct the price towards 
fundamental value. When arbitrage costs binding on arbitrageurs are higher, correction of 
mispricing takes longer hence a stock return anomaly should be more pronounced. The 
contribution of our analysis is to sort out which of the various arbitrage costs constitute the most 
important arbitrage barrier. The set of firm-level arbitrage costs measures we analyze is determined 
by five criteria. First, the measures must have strong theoretical foundations. Second, the literature 
has shown or it is obvious that the measures adequately cover the underlying arbitrage costs 
concepts. Third, the literature has documented positive correlations between the measures and 
some anomalies. Fourth, the measures are somewhat but not extremely correlated. Finally, the 
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measures must have large amounts of data for effective statistical inferences. We discuss the 
shortlist of nine arbitrage costs measures below.7 
 
2.1 Arbitrage risk 
Arbitrage is deemed risky when risk-adverse arbitrageurs cannot entirely diversify or hedge 
away the risk of an arbitrage position they intend to hold. As arbitrageurs are typically under-
diversified and it is difficult to locate the perfect substitutes required to hedge an arbitrage trade, 
idiosyncratic stock return volatility (IVOL) is likely to be a serious concern when they arbitrage 
mispriced stocks (e.g., Pontiff, 1996; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). Pontiff (2006) shows that 
arbitrageurs prefer to hold less of the stocks that carry higher idiosyncratic stock return volatility.8 
Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006), Duan, Hu, 
and McLean (2010) and McLean (2010) show that the negative relations between abnormal returns 
and prior book-to-market equity ratio, accounting accruals, short interests, and three- to five-year 
stock returns, respectively, are stronger when IVOL is higher. Li and Zhang (2010) find that the 
negative relation between capital investment and future returns is stronger when IVOL is higher. 
Similarly, Lam and Wei (2011), and Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2011) find that the negative 
relation between total asset growth and future returns is stronger when IVOL is higher. 
Furthermore, Li and Lou (2016) find that the positive relation between cash holdings and future 
returns is stronger when IVOL is higher. We use 36 months of stock returns prior to the end of 
June of year t to estimate the market model and use the standard deviation of residuals to measure 
                                                
7 Some arbitrage costs concepts such as synchronization risk (e.g., Abreu and Brunnermeirer, 2003) is not included 
here because there is no reliable measure that fits our criteria. 
8 A strand of research documents that idiosyncratic stock return volatility and future stock returns are negatively 
associated (e.g., Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006, 2009). Therefore, exposure to higher idiosyncratic stock return 
volatility is not necessary compensated with a risk premium. 
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IVOL. 9  To standardize the range across arbitrage costs measures, we annually assign 
independently sorted decile rankings to firms based on the measures. The sorting order assigns 
higher arbitrage costs to higher ranking. Thus, arbitrage risk (ARBRISK) of a stock is the decile 
ranking of IVOL. 
 
2.2 Information uncertainty 
There are three typical layers of information uncertainty. First, when a firm’s cash flow is 
more volatile, its fundamental value is more ambiguous. The ambiguity of fundamental value 
reduces the precision of arbitrageurs in identifying mispricing, thereby, they would be less willing 
to arbitrage. Zhang (2006) shows that the post-analyst forecast revision price drift and price 
momentum are stronger when cash flow volatility (CFVOL) is higher. We use the standard 
deviation of asset-scaled cash flow from operations over the previous five fiscal years to measure 
CFVOL. 
Second, when market’s opinions about a firm’s future earnings are more diverse, 
arbitrageurs are less confident in their valuations. Again, arbitrageurs would be more reluctant to 
engage to arbitrage because they are more uncertain about whether the stock is mispriced or not. 
Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP) is associated with disagreement about future earnings 
among market participants (e.g., Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; Zhang, 2006; Cen, Wei, 
and Yang, 2016). Zhang (2006) shows that price momentum is stronger when DISP is higher. We 
use the standard deviation of one-year-ahead analyst earnings forecasts scaled by closing stock 
price at the end of June of year t as to measure DISP. 
                                                
9 Our findings remain similar when we use past weekly returns to estimate the market model or use residuals from the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.	
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Third, arbitrageurs would be more reluctant to arbitrage when they possess less information 
about a firm. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) interpret higher analyst coverage (COV) as lower 
information asymmetry. Gleason and Lee (2003) show that the post-analyst forecast revision price 
drift is stronger when COV is lower. Besides, Zhang (2006) shows that the price momentum is 
more pronounced when COV is lower. We use the number of analysts following the stock at the 
end of June of year t to measure COV. 
We construct an information uncertainty score (INFO-score) that captures the three layers 
of information uncertainty. Each year we independently sort stocks into deciles by CFVOL and 
DISP in ascending order and COV in descending order. INFO-score of a stock is the average of 
these three decile rankings, whichever is available. 
 
2.3 Transaction costs 
The costs and technical difficulties of establishing and exiting an arbitrage position would 
deter arbitrage activity. High transaction costs can turn trading against mispricing unprofitable. 
Arbitrage capital would stay on the sidelines when it is inflexible to move capital in and out of an 
arbitrage trade. There are five typical aspects of transaction costs. 
First, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) show that round-trip broker’s commission and bid-ask 
spreads are inversely related to share price (PRICE). We use the closing share price at the end of 
June of year t to measure PRICE. Second, Bhushan (1994) shows that the time required to fill an 
order or to trade a large block of shares is inversely related to dollar trading volume (DVOL). We 
use the average daily dollar trading volume, which is closing share price multiplied by the trading 
day’s share trading volume, over the year prior to the end of June of year t to measure DVOL. 
Third, the impact of order flow on stock price restricts the amount of capital that can be invested 
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in and liquidated from the stock at a specific price. We measure price impact with Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity (ILLIQ), which is the average of absolute value of daily returns scaled by the trading 
day’s dollar trading volume over the year prior to the end of June of year t. 
Fourth, effective bid-ask spread (BIDASK) refers to the trading expenses for compensating 
dealers for making markets and providing liquidity. We use the average daily closing bid-ask 
spread over the year prior to the end of June of year t to measure BIDASK. Fifth, it is harder to 
borrow shares of stocks that have lower passive institutional ownership (IO) because these stocks 
have low stock loan supply (D’Avolio, 2002; Nagel, 2005). These stocks are also more exposed 
to the risk of short squeeze (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001). Following Nagel 
(2005), we measure potential lending supply as the percentage of outstanding shares held by 
Vanguard 500 index fund and Dimensional Fund Advisors at the end of June of year t.10 Lam and 
Wei show that the asset growth anomaly is stronger when these measures signal higher transaction 
costs. 
We construct a transaction costs score (TCOST-score) that captures the five aspects of 
transaction costs. Each year we independently sort stocks into deciles by PRICE, DVOL, and IO 
in descending order and BIDASK and ILLIQ in ascending order. TCOST-score of a stock is the 
average of these five decile rankings, whichever is available. 
 
2.4 Overall arbitrage costs 
We construct an overall arbitrage costs score	(ARBCOST-score) of a stock by averaging the 
annual decile rankings of nine arbitrage costs measures, whichever is available. We individually 
examine the impact of ARBCOST-score, ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score on cross-
                                                
10 Vanguard 500 index fund and Dimensional Fund Advisors are large index and passive mutual fund families that 
provide most of the stock loan supply. Our findings are similar when we include all institutional shareholders. 
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sectional mispricing. We then examine the impact of ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score 
jointly. 
 
2.5 Time-varying arbitrage costs 
The handy arbitrage costs groups might be too restrictive because they constantly equal weight 
a fixed set of components over time. Alternatively, we perform principal component analysis on 
the nine arbitrage costs measures each year. The statistical combinations of arbitrage costs 
measures of a stock can change over time, depending on the time variation in the measures’ 
empirical cross-sectional distributions. After we individually examine the impact of annually-
varying principal components of arbitrage costs on cross-sectional mispricing, we examine their 
impact jointly. 
Furthermore, we examine jointly the impact of the nine arbitrage costs measures on cross-
sectional mispricing across three subperiods we identify in the return anomalies literature as 
follows. The capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), together with 
efficient capital markets (e.g., Fama, 1965), are the standards in the asset pricing literature and 
research publications documenting return anomalies are scarce until early 1980s. For example, 
only two of the 97 anomalies McLean and Pontiff (2016) examine are published before 1980.11 
Seven of the 97 anomalies are published during the 1980s.12 Change of variance analysis using the 
binary segmentation of Scott and Knott (1974) on the time series (01/1980 to 12/1989) of monthly 
value-weighted alphas of long-short portfolio based on the misprice score detects a change point 
                                                
11 The publications are Blume and Husic (1973) on stock price and Langetieg (1978) on existence of prior acquisition. 
12 The publications are Banz (1981) on firm size, Barry and Brown (1984) on firm age, Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin 
(1984) on earnings surprise, Debondt and Thaler (1985) on long term reversal, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) on bid-
ask spread, Bhandari (1988) on financial leverage, and Jegadeesh (1990) on short term reversal.	
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at 05/1983.13 Due to data availability, the principal components of arbitrage costs begin at 06/1983. 
We therefore break at 06/1983 so later we can pit an arbitrage costs model motivated by the 
subperiod findings against the statistically oriented annually-varying principal components of 
arbitrage costs. We refer to this first subperiod from 07/1963 to 06/1983 as the “pre-discovery 
period”. Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2014) document that many anomalies attenuate 
towards zero around mid 2000’s. Chow test on the time series (07/1983 to 12/2015) of monthly 
value-weighted alphas of long-short portfolio based on the misprice score indicates that the 
breakpoint 12/2004 is significant at the 5% level. For this reason, we end the second subperiod at 
the middle of 2000s, i.e., 12/2004. As mispricing is well-known to be strong during this subperiod, 
we refer to it as the “golden age of mispricing”. Finally, we refer to the third subperiod from 
01/2005 to 12/2015 as the “attenuation period” because mispricing turns weaker in general. 
 
3. The Mispricing Score 
At the end of June of year t, we independently sort stocks into 10 anomaly deciles in 
descending order of total asset growth (TAG), investment-to-assets ratio (I/A), net operating assets 
(NOA), operating accruals (OA), net share issuance (NSI), composite stock issuance (CSI), and 
Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy score (O-score) and in ascending order of gross profitability (GP), 
operating profitability (OP), and prior-year stock return (PRET). We then combine the trading 
strategies into a comprehensive one. The misprice score (MISPRICE-score) of a stock is the 
average of these anomaly rankings, whichever is available. Stocks with higher (lower) MISPRICE-
score are expected to have higher (lower) abnormal stock returns from the sorting date to the end 
                                                
13 This technique applies a single change point method sequentially and, to avoid overfitting, minimizes a cost function 
that penalizes larger number of breakpoints. 
 15 
of June of year t+1. Thus, high (low) MISPRICE-score proxies for relative underpricing 
(overpricing). 
We briefly review the 10 anomalies below. 
(1) TAG: Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2011), Titman, Wei, 
and Xie (2013), and Watanabe, Xu, Yao, Yu (2013) show that firms with higher growth in 
total assets earn lower future abnormal returns. 
(2) I/A: Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008), Xing (2008), and Polk 
and Sapienza (2009) show that firms with higher capital investment earn lower future 
abnormal returns. 
(3) NOA: Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) show that firms with higher net operating 
assets earn lower future abnormal returns. 
(4) OA: Sloan (1996) shows that firms with higher operating accruals earn lower future 
abnormal returns. 
(5) NSI: Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) show that firms issuing more new shares on net earn 
lower future abnormal returns. 
(6) CEI: Daniel and Titman (2006) and Fama and French (2006) show that firms with higher 
composite equity issuance earn lower future abnormal returns. 
(7) O-score: Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilsagyi 
(2008) show that firms with higher bankruptcy likelihood earn lower future abnormal 
returns. 
(8) GP: Novy-Marx (2013) and Sun, Wei, and Xie (2016) show that firms with higher gross 
profitability earn higher future abnormal returns. 
(9) OP: Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, Nikolaev (2015) and Fama and French (2015, 2016) show 
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that firms with higher operating profitability earn higher future abnormal returns. 
(10) PRET: Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2000) and others show that firms with higher stock 
returns during the past three to 12 months earn higher future abnormal returns in the 
following three to 12 months. 
 
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
Our sample contains firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Annual financial 
statements are obtained from Compustat. Monthly and daily stock market data are taken from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Financial analyst data are obtained from I/B/E/S. 
Institutional holdings records are taken from Thomson Reuters (13f) Institutional Holdings.14 
Following Fama and French (1992, 1993), we only include non-financial common stocks. We 
merge monthly stock returns from the end of June of year t to the end of June of year t+1 with 
financial statements for fiscal year t–1 and firm attributes observed at the end of June of year t. 
We further require firms to have valid CAPM beta, market equity, and book-to-market equity ratio 
as well as stock prices being higher than five dollars at the end of June. We use delisting returns 
to reduce survivorship bias.15 The sample period covers fiscal year 1962 to fiscal year 2014. The 
monthly holding period returns extend from 07/1963 to 12/2015. Passive institutional ownership 
starts at 1981.16 Analyst forecast dispersion and coverage begin from 1983. The annual principal 
component analysis begins from 1983 because all nine arbitrage costs measures are required.17 
                                                
14 While information from Data Explorers is used in some recent studies, we are unable to use it in ours because it 
only covers a five-year period that coincides with a time of high market turmoil. 
15 Shumway (1997) suggests that the returns of stocks delisted for poor performance (delisting codes 500 and 520 to 
584) are usually unavailable. Following Shumway and Warther (1999), we use the delisting return when the return is 
missing for a CRSP month date. When the delisting return is not available, we use -30% for poor performance delisting 
and 0% for other cases. The results are almost the same when we use raw returns of -65% or -100% for poor 
performance delisting, which suggests that poor performance delisting plays a negligible role in our findings. 
16	The ownership records of Vanguard 500 index fund and Dimensional Fund Advisors begin from 1981.	
17 Although I/B/E/S provides data that begin from 1976, analyst related variables start at 1983 since I/B/E/S has limited 
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Panel A of Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th/50th/75th percentiles, 
and maximum of arbitrage costs and anomaly variables. We only present the first, second, and 
third principal components (PC1, PC2, and PC3) as they are the only ones that carry eigenvalues 
greater than or equal to one. We also present the statistics of CAPM beta (BETA), market equity 
(ME), and book-to-market equity ratio (B/M), which are used as controls in our Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) regressions. The mean values of ARBCOST-score, ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-
score are 5.498, 5.500, 5.491, and 5.503, respectively. The corresponding median values are 5.530, 
5.708, 5.588, and 5.434. These arbitrage costs variables do not seem to be skewed. Their standard 
deviations are 1.420, 2.872, 1.331, and 1.689, suggesting that they have rather similar variations. 
ARBRISK has a slightly higher variation, which is consistent with the slightly wider range it has. 
The mean, median, and standard deviation of MISPRICE-score, respectively, are 5.501, 5.442, 
and 1.273. Similarly, the misprice score does not seem to be skewed and it possess meaningful 
variation. As the three principal components take rather different values from those of ARBCOST-
score, ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score, we also use independently sorted annual deciles 
of the principal components in Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to ensure fair comparisons. 
[Table 1 here] 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the sample correlations between misprice score and arbitrage 
costs variables. First, MISPRICE-score has low correlations with arbitrage costs variables. For 
example, the correlations of MISPRICE-score with ARBCOST-score, ARBRISK, INFO-score, 
TCOST-score, PC1, PC2, and PC3, respectively, are -6%, -8%, -4%, -6%, -15%, -5%, and 7%. 
The correlations of MISPRICE-score with the nine arbitrage costs measures range from -11% 
(BIDASK) to 11% (PRICE). These indicate that the arbitrage costs variables we develop are rather 
                                                
inclusion of stocks prior to 1983 (e.g., Cen, Wei, and Yang, 2016). 
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orthogonal to the misprice score. Thus, our findings from double-sorted portfolios are not likely 
driven by the arbitrage costs sorts simply refining the misprice score sort. 
ARBCOST-score exhibits high correlations with ARBRISK (73%), INFO-score (67%), and 
TCOST-score (93%). This is not surprising given ARBCOST-score is made to be an overall 
arbitrage costs measure. The correlations between ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score are 
not as high and range from 42% to 56%, suggesting that there is some commonality among the 
arbitrage costs group scores. 
By design, PC1, PC2, and PC3 are uncorrelated. PC1 is highly correlated with ARBCOST-
score (88%). PC1 is also correlated with ARBRISK (76%), INFO-score (66%), and TCOST-score 
(81%). As such, PC1 highly resembles an overall arbitrage costs measure, but PC1 contains less 
information on transaction costs than ARBCOST-score. As PC1 already picks up a substantial 
amount of arbitrage costs information, PC2 is much less correlated with ARBCOST-score (11%). 
PC2 is correlated with ARBRISK (35%) and INFO-score (18%) but not much with TCOST-score 
(-5%). Essentially, PC2 picks up the residual information about arbitrage risk and information 
uncertainty. PC3 has very low correlations with ARBCOST-score (0%), ARBRISK (5%), INFO-
score (-7%), and TCOST-score (3%). Comparatively, PC3 is not as informative. 
The correlations between nine arbitrage costs measures range from 29% (IVOL and PRICE) 
to 56% (IVOL and BIDASK). Correlations that are larger than 30% in absolute values include the 
one between IVOL and CFVOL (38%), the one between COV and DVOL (44%), and the one 
between PRICE and DVOL (38%). The nine arbitrage costs measures are somewhat but not 
extremely correlated. It is necessary to pit the measures against each other when examining their 
impact on cross-sectional mispricing. 
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5. Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports Fama and French (1993) three-factor alphas on value-weighted portfolios 
sorted at the end of June of year t by quintiles of MISPRICE-score or each component anomaly 
variable. The portfolios are held until the end of June of year t+1. The long-short strategy (Long-
short) simultaneously buys the high MISPRICE-score quintile (Underpriced) and shorts the low 
MISPRICE-score quintile (Overpriced). For brevity, we do not report results from equal-weighted 
portfolios as all of them are similar to, and for various occasions being stronger than, those from 
value-weighted portfolios. 
[Table 2 here] 
The long-short strategy based on MISPRICE-score generates an alpha of 0.66% (t-statistic 
= 5.58) per month. The strategies based on component anomaly variables generate alphas from 
0.12% (t-statistic = 1.25) to 0.56% (t-statistic = 4.86). The long-short alpha based on MISPRICE-
score is higher but less volatility than those based on component anomaly variables. MISPRICE-
score contains more precise information about cross-sectional mispricing as it combines 
information and diversifies noise from individual anomalies away. 
 
5.1 Arbitrage costs scores 
5.1.1 ARBCOST-score 
Table 3 reports alphas on portfolios independently sorted at the end of June of year t by 
quintiles of MISPRICE-score and quintiles of ARBCOST-score. The portfolios are held until the 
end of June of year t+1. For each ARBCOST-score quintile, the long-short strategy (Long-short) 
simultaneously buys the high MISPRICE-score quintile (Underpriced) and shorts the low 
MISPRICE-score quintile (Overpriced). For each MISPRICE-score quintile, the high-low strategy 
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(High-low) simultaneously buys the high ARBCOST-score quintile (High costs) and shorts the 
low ARBCOST-score quintile (Low costs). 
[Table 3 here] 
In the high ARBCOST-score quintile, overpriced portfolio generates an alpha of -0.92% (t-
statistic = -7.14) while underpriced portfolio generates an alpha of 0.35% (t-statistic = 2.47). The 
long-short strategy generates an alpha of 1.27% (t-statistic = 6.52). 72% (0.92%/1.27%) of the 
long-short alpha comes from the short leg, suggesting that high overall arbitrage costs impede 
shorting overpriced stocks more than longing underpriced stocks. The long-short alpha declines 
from the high ARBCOST-score quintile to the low ARBCOST-score quintile. In the low 
ARBCOST-score quintile, overpriced portfolio generates an alpha of -0.19% (t-statistic = -2.28) 
while underpriced portfolio generates an alpha of 0.25% (t-statistic = 3.73). The long-short strategy 
generates an alpha of 0.44% (t-statistic = 4.38). The difference in long-short alpha between high 
and low ARBCOST-score quintiles reported at the bottom right corner cell is 0.83% (t-statistic = 
4.50). Low overall arbitrage costs significantly reduce mispricing in the cross section. In the 
Overpriced quintile, high costs portfolio generates an alpha of -0.92% (t-statistic = -7.14) while 
low costs portfolio generates an alpha of -0.19% (t-statistic = -2.28). The high-low strategy 
generates an alpha of -0.73% (t-statistic = -4.74). In the Underpriced quintile, high costs portfolio 
generates an alpha of 0.35% (t-statistic = 2.47) while low costs portfolio generates an alpha of 
0.25% (t-statistic = 3.73). The high-low strategy only generates an alpha of 0.10% (t-statistic = 
0.73). High overall arbitrage costs impede shorting overpriced stocks more significantly than 
longing underpriced stocks. 
We analyze the impact of overall arbitrage costs in the time series. Figure 1 shows the 5-
year moving average of annualized long-short alphas for low ARBCOST-score quintile 
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(ARBCOST-score1) and high ARBCOST-score quintile (ARBCOST-score5).18 The long-short 
strategy in ARBCOST-score5 outperforms the strategy in ARBCOST-score1 except in 1967, 
1968, and 1969. These are consistent with the results in Table 3. 
[Figure 1 here] 
The long-short strategy in ARBCOST-score5 generates positive average alphas every year. 
The larger average alphas occur between early 1980’s and mid 2000’s. After 2005, the average 
alphas become much smaller. The impact of overall arbitrage costs also weakens in recent years, 
which is consistent with the recent improvements in market quality and financial innovations (e.g., 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong, 2014; Ljungqvist and Qian, 2016). The long-short strategy in 
ARBCOST-score1 generates positive but comparatively small average alphas until 2005 and the 
average alphas become smaller and more volatile afterwards. 
Figure 2 shows the 5-year moving average of annualized high-low alphas for low 
MISPRICE-score quintile (OVERPRICE) and high MISPRICE-score quintile (UNDERPRICE). 
The high-low strategy in UNDERPRICE generates positive average alphas except for 1972, 2004, 
2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. In 86% (42/49) of the time, high overall arbitrage costs increase 
the alpha of underpriced portfolio. However, some of the average alphas are rather small (e.g., the 
average alphas for 1969, 1971, 1986, 1987, 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2014). For the 31 years between 
1973 and 2003, the average alphas are continuously positive, but the streak breaks in recent years. 
From 2004 to 2015, half of the average alphas, namely those for 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
and 2012, are negative. It seems that recent market improvements substantially reduce the impact 
of overall arbitrage costs on underpriced stocks. 
[Figure 2 here] 
                                                
18 The moving average reduces noise and produces a smoother graph. The patterns are similar without the moving 
average. 
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The high-low strategy in OVERPRICE generates consistently negative average alphas since 
1978. In 88% (43/49) of the time, high overall arbitrage costs reduce the alpha of overpriced 
portfolio. The exceptions cluster in the earlier years 1967, 1968, 1969, 1975, 1976, and 1977. The 
magnitudes of average high-low alphas in OVERPRICE are generally larger than in 
UNDERPRICE, which echoes the concept of arbitrage asymmetry. The average high-low alphas 
in OVERPRICE somewhat drop in recent years, but not as much as the average high-low alphas 
in UNDERPRICE. Recent market improvements seem to influence the impact of overall arbitrage 
costs on underpriced stocks more than on overpriced stocks. 
 
5.1.2 ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score 
Table 4 repeats the portfolio analysis in Table 3 with ARBCOST-score replaced by 
ARBRISK (Panel A), INFO-score (Panel B), or TCOST-score (Panel C). The long-short alphas 
are 1.24% (t-statistic = 5.36), 1.20% (t-statistic = 5.02), and 1.16% (t-statistic = 7.41), respectively, 
in high ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score quintiles. More than half of the long-short 
alpha comes from the short leg, suggesting that high overall arbitrage costs impede shorting 
overpriced stocks more than longing underpriced stocks, for all three arbitrage costs groups. 
[Table 4 here] 
The long-short alphas decline from the high arbitrage costs group quintile to the low 
arbitrage costs group quintile. The long-short alphas are 0.32% (t-statistic = 3.16), 0.65% (t-
statistic = 5.07), and 0.56% (t-statistic = 4.54), respectively, in low ARBRISK, INFO-score, and 
TCOST-score quintiles. The differences in long-short alpha between high and low arbitrage costs 
group quintiles are 0.92% (t-statistic = 4.08), 0.55% (t-statistic = 2.26), and 0.61% (t-statistic = 
3.84), respectively, for arbitrage risk, information uncertainty, and transaction costs. For all 
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groupings, low arbitrage costs significantly reduce mispricing in the cross section. In the 
Overpriced quintile, the high-low alphas are -0.84% (t-statistic = -4.95), -0.60% (t-statistic = -
3.41), and -0.48% (t-statistic = -4.13), respectively, for arbitrage risk, information uncertainty, and 
transaction cost. In the Underpriced quintile, the high-low alphas are 0.08% (t-statistic = 0.34), -
0.05% (t-statistic = -0.33), and 0.13% (t-statistic = 0.94), respectively, for arbitrage risk, 
information uncertainty, and transaction costs. For all groupings, high arbitrage costs impede 
shorting overpriced stocks more significantly than longing underpriced stocks. The impact on 
mispricing seems to vary across the arbitrage costs groups. For example, the difference in long-
short alpha between high and low arbitrage risk is 0.92%, which is higher than the difference based 
on information uncertainty (0.55%), transaction costs (0.61%), and even overall arbitrage costs 
(0.83%). 
 
5.1.3 Multivariate Fama-MacBeth regressions 
Table 5 reports regression results for investigating overall arbitrage costs, arbitrage risk, 
information uncertainty, and transaction costs individually and jointly. To ease the presentation, 
we multiply slopes by 10. Monthly cross-sectional regressions in Panel A are estimated by OLS. 
Column (1) reports slope estimates of the baseline	regression that includes MISPRICE-score and 
controls. The MISPRICE-score slope is 2.183 (t-statistic = 9.28), which echoes the positive long-
short alpha in portfolio analysis. Column (2) adds ARBCOST-score and the interaction between 
MISPRICE-score and ARBCOST-score. The MISPRICE-score slope is -0.556 (t-statistic = -1.09) 
and the interactive slope is 0.476 (t-statistic = 4.91). Consistent with double portfolio sorts, firms 
with higher MISPRICE-score generate higher adjusted stock returns that are even higher when 
ARBCOST-score is higher. When ARBCOST-score is replaced by ARBRISK in column (3), 
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INFO-score in column (4), and TCOST-score in column (5), the interactive slopes, respectively, 
are 0.264 (t-statistic = 4.94), 0.383 (t-statistic = 4.50), and 0.332 (t-statistic = 4.40). Consistent 
with double portfolios sorts, each arbitrage costs group impacts mispricing according to the limits-
to-arbitrage argument. 
[Table 5 here] 
The key regression reported in column (6) simultaneously includes MISPRICE-score, 
ARBRISK, INFO-score, TCOST-score, and the interactions between MISPRICE-score and 
arbitrage costs group variables. The MISPRICE-score slope is -0.559 (t-statistic = -1.06). The 
interactive slopes for ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score, respectively, are 0.177 (t-
statistic = 3.22), 0.173 (t-statistic = 2.22), and 0.125 (t-statistic = 1.68). The arbitrage costs groups 
jointly impact cross-sectional mispricing according to the limits-to-arbitrage argument. However, 
the impact of transaction costs is comparatively the weakest. 
Monthly cross-sectional regressions in Panel B are estimated by WLS that weighs an 
observation by its prior-month market equity. These regressions emphasize on larger cap stocks. 
Column (1) reports slope estimates of the baseline regression. The MISPRICE-score slope is 1.434 
(t-statistic = 5.38). Column (2) adds ARBCOST-score and the interaction between MISPRICE-
score and ARBCOST-score. The MISPRICE-score slope is 0.127 (t-statistic = 0.20) and the 
interactive slope is 0.355 (t-statistic = 2.39). When ARBCOST-score is replaced by ARBRISK in 
column (3), INFO-score in column (4), and TCOST-score in column (5), the interactive slopes are, 
respectively, 0.245 (t-statistic = 2.80), 0.038 (t-statistic = 0.26), and 0.375 (t-statistic = 2.58). 
Arbitrage risk and transaction costs impact mispricing according to the limits-to-arbitrage 
argument. Information uncertainty no longer impacts mispricing in linear regression when larger 
cap stocks are emphasized. 
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The key regression reported in column (6) simultaneously includes MISPRICE-score, 
ARBRISK, INFO-score, TCOST-score, and the interactions between MISPRICE-score and 
arbitrage costs group variables. The MISPRICE-score slope is 1.305 (t-statistic = 1.70). The 
interactive slopes for ARBRISK, INFO-score, and TCOST-score, respectively, are 0.216 (t-
statistic = 2.15), -0.183 (t-statistic = -1.30), and 0.084 (t-statistic = 0.52). Only arbitrage risk 
impacts cross-sectional mispricing. These findings are consistent with larger cap stocks having 
better information quality (e.g., Ohlson, 1995; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) and being less 
expensive to trade (e.g., Novy-Marx and Velikov, 2016). 
 
5.2 Annually-varying principal components of arbitrage costs 
Panel A of Table 6 presents year-by-year percentages of total variance explained by each of 
the nine principal components (PC1 to PC9). The percentages are generally stable over the years. 
On average, the first, second, and third principal components together capture 59% of the total 
variance. Panel B presents year-by-year eigenvalues of each principal components. The 
eigenvalues are stable throughout the years. The first, second, and third principal components carry 
eigenvalues greater than or equal to one every year. As a result, they also have eigenvalues greater 
than or equal to one on average. 
[Table 6 here] 
Panel C presents time-series average eigenvectors of the PC1, PC2, and PC3. PC1 positively 
loads on IVOL, CFVOL, BIDASK, and IO and negatively loads on COV, PRICE, and DVOL. A 
higher value of PC1 is associated with higher arbitrage risk, higher information uncertainty in 
terms of higher cash flow volatility and lower analyst coverage, and higher transaction costs via 
higher effective	bid-ask spread and lower share price and dollar trading volume. However, it is 
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associated with lower transaction costs in terms of higher passive institutional ownership. PC2 
positively loads on IVOL, CFVOL, COV, DVOL, and BIDASK and negatively loads on IO. A 
higher value of PC2 is associated with higher arbitrage risk, higher information uncertainty in 
terms of higher cash flow volatility, and higher transaction costs via higher effective	bid-ask spread 
and lower passive institutional ownership. However, it is associated with lower information 
uncertainty in terms of higher analyst coverage and lower transaction costs in terms of higher 
dollar trading volume. PC1 and PC2 are similar in how they relate to IVOL, CFVOL, and BIDASK 
but they are different in how they relate to COV, PRICE, DVOL, and IO. PC3 loads on DISP, on 
which PC1 and PC2 do not. 
Table 7 reports alphas of value-weighted portfolios sorted by quintiles of MISPRICE-score 
and quintiles of PC1 (Panel A), PC2 (Panel B), or PC3 (Panel C). The long-short alphas are 2.22% 
(t-statistic = 5.26) and 1.05% (t-statistic = 5.03) in the high PC1 and PC2 quintiles, respectively.	
These long-short alphas decline to 0.52% (t-statistic = 3.56) and 0.20% (t-statistic = 1.08) as we 
move to the low quintiles. The corresponding differences in long-short alpha are 1.70% (t-statistic 
= 4.28) and 0.85% (t-statistic = 3.66). PC1 and PC2 significantly impact mispricing in the cross 
section.	In the Overpriced quintile, the high-low alphas are -1.16% (t-statistic = -4.02) and -0.88% 
(t-statistic = -3.84) for PC1 and PC2, respectively. In the Underpriced quintile, the high-low alphas 
are 0.43% (t-statistic = 2.30) and -0.03% (t-statistic = -0.18) for PC1 and PC2, respectively. 
Resembling overall arbitrage costs and arbitrage costs groups, high arbitrage costs identified by 
the first and second principal components impede shorting overpriced stocks more significantly 
than longing underpriced stocks.	However, PC3 does not impact mispricing according to the 
limits-to-arbitrage argument. The long-short alpha is merely 0.39% (t-statistic = 1.94) in the high 
PC3 quintile but it is 1.00% (t-statistic = 4.11) in the low PC3 quintile. The difference in long-
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short alpha is -0.62% (t-statistic = -2.46). Furthermore, portfolio and regression results show that 
the remaining principal components do not impact mispricing.	
[Table 7 here] 
Table 8 reports regression results for investigating the first, second, and third annually-
varying principal components of arbitrage costs individually and jointly. Monthly regressions 
reported in columns (1) to (5) are estimated with OLS. Column (1) reports slope estimates of the 
baseline regression. The MISPRICE-score slope is 2.300 (t-statistic = 6.81). Columns (2/3/4) add 
PC1/PC2/PC3 decile (PC1_dec/PC2_dec/PC3_dec) sorted independently at the end of June each 
year and the interaction between MISPRICE-score and principal component decile. The interactive 
slopes for PC1_dec, PC2_dec, and PC3_dec, respectively, are 0.344 (t-statistic = 4.55), 0.282 (t-
statistic = 4.59), and -0.002 (t-statistic = -0.04). Consistent with double portfolio sorts, PC1 and 
PC2 does but PC3 does not impact mispricing according to the limits-to-arbitrage argument. 
[Table 8 here] 
The key regression reported in column (5) simultaneously includes MISPRICE-score, 
PC1_dec, PC2_dec, and the interactions between MISPRICE-score and principal component 
deciles. The interactive slopes for PC1_dec and PC2_dec are 0.264 (t-statistic = 3.34) and 0.249 
(t-statistic = 4.45), respectively. The first and second principal components jointly impact cross-
sectional mispricing in a similar manner. 
Monthly regressions reported in columns (6) to (10) are estimated with WLS, which 
emphasizes on larger cap stocks. Column (6) reports slope estimates of the baseline regression. 
The MISPRICE-score slope is 1.280 (t-statistic = 3.39). Columns (7/8/9) add PC1/PC2/PC3 decile 
and the interaction between MISPRICE-score and principal component decile. The interactive 
 28 
slopes for PC1_dec, PC2_dec, and PC3_dec, respectively, are 0.155 (t-statistic = 1.83), 0.109 (t-
statistic = 1.17), and -0.152 (t-statistic = -1.82). 
The key regression reported in column (6) simultaneously includes MISPRICE-score, 
PC1_dec, PC2_dec, and the interactions between MISPRICE-score and principal component 
deciles. The interactive slopes for PC1_dec and PC2_dec are 0.200 (t-statistic = 2.21) and 0.198 
(t-statistic = 2.03), respectively. The first and second principal components jointly impact cross-
sectional mispricing in a similar manner even when larger cap stocks are emphasized.19 
 
5.3 Subperiod analysis of nine arbitrage costs measures 
Table 9 reports regressions for three subperiods. The baseline monthly cross-sectional 
regressions in Panel A are estimated by OLS. The MISPRICE-score slope is 2.019 (t-statistic = 
7.40) in the pre-discovery period (07/1963-06/1983). The slope rises to 2.951 (t-statistic = 7.91) 
during the golden age of mispricing (07/1983-12/2004) and it falls to 0.835 (t-statistic = 2.21) in 
the attenuation period (01/2005-12/2015). Mispricing becomes economically weaker but continues 
to exist in recent years. 
[Table 9 here] 
The baseline monthly cross-sectional regressions in Panel B are estimated by WLS, which 
emphasizes on larger cap stocks. The MISPRICE-score slope is 1.753 (t-statistic = 5.37) in the 
pre-discovery period. The slope drops to 1.496 (t-statistic = 1.21) during the golden age of 
mispricing and it further drops to 0.796 (t-statistic = 2.21) in the attenuation period. When larger 
cap stocks are emphasized, mispricing becomes economically weaker over time. In the recent years, 
the MISPRICE-score slope is volatile and mispricing is absent. 
                                                
19 The findings remain the same if we add PC3_dec and MISPRICE-score × PC3_dec to the key regressions. 
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Panel C reports the key OLS regressions that simultaneously include MISPRICE-score, 
deciles of the nine arbitrage costs measures independently sorted at the end of June each year, and 
the interactions between MISPRICE-score and arbitrage costs deciles. In the pre-discovery period, 
eight out of the nine interactive slopes are insignificant. The interactive slope for CFVOL_dec, 
which is 0.090 (t-statistic = 1.68), is the exception. Yet, it is not only marginally significant at the 
10% level but also economically insignificant. Arbitrage costs have tiny impact on mispricing.  
During the golden age of mispricing, the interactive slopes for ARBRISK, CFVOL_dec, 
PRICE_dec, and IO_dec, respectively, are 0.348 (t-statistic = 4.89), 0.097 (t-statistic = 1.82), 0.278 
(t-statistic = 2.97), and 0.140 (t-statistic = 2.85). The other interactive slopes are insignificant. On 
the one hand, arbitrage risk, ambiguity of fundamental value, round-trip broker’s commission plus 
bid-ask spreads, and stock loan supply jointly impact cross-sectional mispricing according to the 
limits-to-arbitrage argument. On the other hand, divergence in opinion on future earnings, 
information asymmetry, liquidity, price impact, and compensation for liquidity provision are not 
binding on arbitrageurs. 
In the attenuation period, the interactive slope for PRICE_dec and IO_dec are 0.218 (t-
statistic = 1.66) and 0.339 (t-statistic = 4.94), respectively. The interactive slope is -0.799 (t-
statistic = -2.02) for DVOL_dec and 0.828 (t-statistic = 1.87) for ILLIQ_dec. It is counterintuitive 
that the two transaction costs measures have opposite effects on mispricing. In view of the negative 
correlation between these measures, we estimate the regression without DVOL_dec or ILLIQ_dec. 
The interactive slope for DVOL_dec is 0.097 (t-statistic = 1.47) without ILLIQ_dec and the 
interactive slope for ILLIQ_dec is 0.057 (t-statistic = 0.70) without DVOL_dec. In both cases, the 
interactive slopes for PRICE_dec and IO_dec are positive and significant. In all three 
specifications, other interactive slopes are insignificant. That is, only round-trip broker’s 
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commission plus bid-ask spreads and stock loan supply impact cross-sectional mispricing and are 
binding on arbitrageurs. 
Panel D reports the key WLS regressions that simultaneously include MISPRICE-score, nine 
arbitrage costs deciles, and the interactions between MISPRICE-score and arbitrage costs deciles. 
These regressions emphasize on larger cap stocks. In the pre-discovery period, none of the 
interactive slopes is significant. Arbitrage costs do not impact cross-sectional mispricing. During 
the golden age of mispricing, the interactive slope for ARBRISK is 0.354 (t-statistic = 2.01). The 
other interactive slopes are insignificant. Only arbitrage risk impacts mispricing and is binding on 
arbitrageurs. In the attenuation period, all interactive slopes are insignificant. Given the absence 
of mispricing in this subperiod, it is not surprising that arbitrage costs are not binding. 
 
5.4 Empirical arbitrage costs model vs. annually-varying principal components 
Findings in Section 5.3 suggest an empirical model that uses arbitrage risk, ambiguity of 
fundamental value, round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads, and stock loan supply in 
the golden age of mispricing, and round-trip broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads and stock 
loan supply in the attenuation period as the binding arbitrage costs. When larger cap stocks are 
emphasized, the model uses arbitrage risk in the golden age of mispricing. Columns (1) and (2) in 
Panel A of Table 10 presents this empirical arbitrage costs model.20 The OLS regression for the 
golden age of mispricing simultaneously includes MISRPICE-score, deciles of ARBRISK, 
CFVOL, PRICE, and IO, and the interactions between MISRPICE-score and arbitrage costs 
deciles. The interactive slopes for ARBRISK, CFVOL_dec, PRICE_dec, and IO_dec, respectively, 
are 0.324 (t-statistic = 4.36), 0.103 (t-statistic = 1.87), 0.194 (t-statistic = 2.70), and 0.174 (t-
                                                
20 For fair comparison, we require firms to have valid observations for all nine arbitrage costs measures. 
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statistic = 3.64). The OLS regression for the attenuation period simultaneously includes 
MISRPICE-score, deciles of PRICE and IO, and the interactions between MISRPICE-score and 
the deciles. The interactive slopes for PRICE_dec and IO_dec are 0.277 (t-statistic = 2.52) and 
0.336 (t-statistic = 5.82), respectively. 
Columns (3) and (4) present OLS regressions that simultaneously include MISRPICE-score, 
deciles of PC1 and PC2, and the interactions between MISRPICE-score and the deciles. During 
the golden age of mispricing, the interactive slopes for PC1_dec and PC2_dec are 0.365 (t-statistic 
= 3.68) and 0.257 (t-statistic = 3.72), respectively. The principal components jointly impact 
mispricing. In the attenuation period, the interactive slopes for PC1_dec and PC2_dec are 0.036 
(t-statistic = 0.42) and 0.233 (t-statistic = 2.44), respectively. Mirroring the empirical model, fewer 
of the arbitrage costs are binding on arbitrageurs. 
Columns (5) and (6) pit the empirical arbitrage costs model against the annually-varying 
principal components of arbitrage costs. The OLS regression for the golden age of mispricing 
simultaneously includes MISRPICE-score, deciles of ARBRISK, CFVOL, PRICE, IO, PC1, and 
PC2, and the interactions between MISRPICE-score and the deciles. The interactive slopes for 
ARBRISK, CFVOL_dec, PRICE_dec, IO_dec, PC1_dec, and PC2_dec, respectively, are 0.283 (t-
statistic = 3.50), 0.078 (t-statistic = 1.39), 0.191 (t-statistic = 2.77), 0.171 (t-statistic = 3.51), 0.057 
(t-statistic = 0.72), and 0.063 (t-statistic = 0.99). The OLS regression for the attenuation period 
simultaneously includes MISRPICE-score, deciles of PRICE, IO, PC1, and PC2, and the 
interactions between MISRPICE-score and the deciles. The interactive slopes for PRICE_dec, 
IO_dec, PC1_dec, and PC2_dec, respectively, are 0.268 (t-statistic = 2.05), 0.278 (t-statistic = 
4.61), -0.013 (t-statistic = -0.13), and 0.123 (t-statistic = 1.27). In the golden age of mispricing and 
the attenuation period, the empirical model subsumes the annually-varying principal components. 
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Column (1) in Panel B presents the empirical arbitrage costs model when larger cap stocks 
are emphasized. The WLS regression for the golden age of mispricing simultaneously includes 
MISRPICE-score, ARBRISK, and the interaction between MISRPICE-score and ARBRISK. The 
interactive slope for ARBRISK is 0.517 (t-statistic = 3.43). Column (2) presents the WLS 
regression that simultaneously includes MISRPICE-score, deciles of PC1 and PC2, and the 
interactions between MISRPICE-score and the deciles. The interactive slopes for PC1_dec and 
PC2_dec are 0.289 (t-statistic = 2.49) and 0.269 (t-statistic = 2.26), respectively. Both principal 
components impact mispricing. 
Column (3) pits the empirical arbitrage costs model against the annually-varying principal 
components of arbitrage costs. The WLS regression simultaneously includes MISRPICE-score, 
ARBRISK, deciles of PC1 and PC2, and the interactions between MISRPICE-score and the deciles. 
The interactive slopes ARBRISK, PC1_dec, and PC2_dec, respectively, are 0.500 (t-statistic = 
2.56), -0.073 (t-statistic = -0.48), and 0.128 (t-statistic = 1.01). When larger cap stocks are 
emphasized, the empirical model still subsumes the annually-varying principal components. 
 
6. Conclusion 
For any cross-sectional stock return anomaly, there are two economic explanations: one is 
rational pricing and the other one is behavioral mispricing. The rational explanation argues that 
stocks earn higher future returns because they are discounted more to compensate for higher 
systematic risks. The behavioral explanation suggests that stocks are mispriced due to investors’ 
psychological biases. To test the mispricing explanation for an anomaly, a current norm is to apply 
the limits-to-arbitrage argument, which predicts the anomaly to be stronger when arbitrage costs 
are higher. The literature documents positive correlations between various anomalies and arbitrage 
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costs. However, there is a tendency to use different arbitrage costs measures across different papers 
because the literature has not studied out which of the various arbitrage costs constitutes the most 
crucial arbitrage barrier. 
In this paper, we take nine arbitrage costs measures that have strong theoretical motivations 
and large amounts of data, and are reliable and commonly used in the anomalies literature as given, 
and we systematically perform an empirical investigation on their impact on cross-sectional 
mispricing. We utilize an extensive list of well-known and robust anomalies to ensure our findings 
are general. Results based on monthly U.S. stock returns from 07/1963 to 12/2015 indicate that 
overall arbitrage costs impact, mainly through the short leg, anomalous returns in the cross section. 
Three typical arbitrage costs groups, namely arbitrage risk, information uncertainty, and 
transaction costs, are jointly important. Only arbitrage risk matters when larger cap stocks are 
emphasized. 
The main finding we uncover is that binding arbitrage barriers slowly change over time. In 
the early years when there are few publications documenting return anomalies, arbitrage costs have 
tiny impact even though mispricing is present. As anomalies become more extensively known, 
arbitrage costs impact mispricing substantially. Arbitrage risk (idiosyncratic stock return 
volatility), ambiguity of fundamental value (cash flow volatility), round-trip broker’s commission 
plus bid-ask spreads (share price), and stock loan supply (passive institutional ownership) are 
binding on arbitrageurs. Only arbitrage risk is binding if larger cap stocks are emphasized. In recent 
years, as market quality improves and some arbitrageurs become more creative, only round-trip 
broker’s commission plus bid-ask spreads and stock loan supply remain binding on arbitrageurs. 
When larger cap stocks are emphasized, arbitrage costs do not matter at all because there is no 
longer mispricing. This indicates that the significance of some arbitrage costs groups in the entire 
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sample is periodic. Besides, the significance of information uncertainty stems from ambiguity of 
fundamental value while the significance of transaction costs stems from round-trip broker’s 
commission plus bid-ask spreads and stock loan supply. An empirical arbitrage costs model based 
on these simple dynamics subsumes annually-varying principal components of arbitrage costs in 
affecting mispricing. Incorporating our findings into future capital market efficiency research 
would mitigate type I and II errors in empirical tests using the limits-to-arbitrage argument. 
  
 35 
References 
 
Abreu, Dilip, and Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003. Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–
204.  
 
Almazan, Andres, Keith C. Brown, Murray Carlson, and David A. Chapman, 2004. Why constrain 
your mutual fund manager? Journal of Financial Economics 73, 289–321.  
 
Ang, Andrew, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing, and Xiaoyan Zhang, 2006. The cross-section of 
volatility and expected returns, Journal of Finance 61, 259–299. 
 
Ang, Andrew, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing, and Xiaoyan Zhang, 2009. High idiosyncratic 
volatility and low returns: international and further U.S. evidence, Journal of Financial 
Economics 91, 1–23. 
 
Ali, Ashiq, Lee-Seok Hwang, and Mark A. Trombley, 2003. Arbitrage risk and the book-to-market 
anomaly, Journal of Financial Economics 69, 355–373. 
 
Amihud, Yakov, and Haim Mendelson, 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread, Journal of 
Financial Economics 17, 223–249. 
 
Amihud, Yakov, 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects, Journal 
of Financial Markets 5, 31–56. 
 
Ball, Ray, Joseph Gerakos, Juhani T. Linnainmaa, and Valeri V. Nikolaev, 2015. Deflating 
profitability, Journal of Financial Economics 117, 225–248. 
 
Banz, Rolf W., 1981. The relationship between return and market value of common stocks, Journal 
of Financial Economics 9, 3–18. 
 
Barry, Christopher B., and Stephen J. Brown, 1984. Differential information and the small firm 
effect, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 283–294. 
 
Bhandari, Laxmi Chand, 1988. Debt/Equity ratio and expected common stock returns: empirical 
evidence, Journal of Finance 43, 507–528. 
 
Bhardwaj, Ravinder K., and Leroy D. Brooks, 1992. The January anomaly: effects of low share 
price, transaction costs, and bid-ask bias, Journal of Finance 47, 553–575. 
 
Bhushan, Ravi, 1994. An informational efficiency perspective on the post-earnings announcement 
drift, Journal of Accounting and Economics 18, 45–66. 
 
Blume, Marshall E., and Frank Husic, 1973. Price, beta, and exchange listing, Journal of Finance 
28, 283–299. 
 
 36 
Brav, Alon, J.B. Heaton, and Si Li, 2010. The limits of the limits of arbitrage, Review of Finance 
14, 157–187. 
 
Campbell, John, Y., Jens Hilscher, and Jan Szilsagyi, 2008. In search of distress risk, Journal of 
Finance 63, 2899–2939.  
 
Carhart, Mark M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance 52, 57–
82. 
 
Cao, Jie and Bing Han, 2016. Idiosyncratic risk, costly arbitrage and the cross-section of stock 
returns, Journal of Banking and Finance 73, 1–15. 
 
Cen, Ling, K.C. John Wei, and Liyan Yang, 2016. Disagreement, underreaction, and stock returns, 
Management Science, forthcoming  
 
Chen, Te-Feng, Sun Lei, K.C. John Wei, and Feixue Xie, 2016. On the explanations for the gross 
profitability effect: insights from international equity markets, working paper presented at the 
2014 European Finance Association Annual Meeting. 
 
Chen, Nai-Fu, Richard Roll, and Stephen A. Ross, 1986. Economic forces and the stock market, 
Journal of Business 59, 383–403. 
 
Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen, and Michael J. Schill, 2008. Asset growth and the cross-
section of stock returns, Journal of Finance 63, 1609–1651. 
 
Daniel, Kent, and Sheridan Titman, 2006. Market reaction to tangible and intangible information, 
Journal of Finance 52, 1–33. 
 
D’Avolio, Gene, 2002. The market for borrowing stock, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 271–
306. 
 
De Bondt, Werner F.M., and Richard Thaler, 1985. Does the stock market overreact? Journal of 
Finance 40, 793–805. 
 
Dechow, Patricia M., Amy P. Hutton, Lisa K. Meulbroek, and Richard G. Sloan, 2001. Short-
sellers, fundamental analysis, and stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics 61, 77–106. 
 
De Long, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. Noise 
trader risk in financial markets, Journal of Political Economy 98, 703–738. 
 
Dichev, Ilia D., 1998. Is the risk of bankruptcy a systematic risk? Journal of finance 53, 1131–
1147. 
 
Diether, Karl, Christopher Malloy, and Anna Scherbina, 2002. Differences of opinion and the 
cross-section of stock returns, Journal of Finance 57, 2113–2141. 
 
 37 
Duan, Ying, Gang Hu, and R. David McLean, 2010. Costly arbitrage and idiosyncratic risk: 
evidence from short sellers, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19, 564–579. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., 1965. The behavior of stock market prices, Journal of business 38, 34–105. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns, 
Journal of Finance 47, 427–465. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2006. Profitability, investment and average returns, 
Journal of Financial Economics 82, 491–518. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2015. A five-factor asset pricing model, Journal of 
Financial Economics 116, –22. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2016. Dissecting anomalies with a five-factor model, 
Review of Financial Studies 29, 69–103. 
 
Fama, Eugene F. and James D. MacBeth, 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests, 
Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636. 
 
Foster, George, Chris Olsen, and Terry Shevlin, 1984. Earnings releases, anomalies, and the 
behavior of security returns, The Accounting Review 59, 574–603. 
 
Gleason, Cristi A., and Charles M.C. Lee, 2003. Analyst forecast revisions and market price 
discovery, The Accounting Review 78, 193–225. 
 
Griffin, John M., and Michael L. Lemmon, 2002. Book-to-market equity, distress risk, and stock 
returns, Journal of Finance 57, 2317–2336. 
 
Gromb, Denis, and Dimitri Vayanos, 2010. Limits of arbitrage, Annual Review of Financial 
Economics 2, 251–275. 
 
Hirshleifer, David, Kewei Hou, Siew H. Teoh, and Yinglei Zhang, 2004. Do investors overvalue 
firms with bloated balance sheets? Journal of Accounting and Economics 38, 297–331. 
 
Hong, Harrison, Terence Lim, and Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst 
coverage, and the profitability of momentum strategies, Journal of Finance 55, 265–295. 
 
Hong, Harrison, and David Sraer, 2016. Speculative betas, Journal of Finance 71, 2095–2144. 
 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, 1990. Evidence of predictable behavioral of security returns, Journal of 
Finance 45, 881–898. 
 
 38 
Lam, F.Y. Eric C., and K.C. John Wei, 2011. Limits-to-arbitrage, investment frictions, and the 
asset growth anomaly, Journal of Financial Economics 102, 127–149. 
 
Langetieg, Terence C., 1978. An application of a three-factor performance index to measure 
stockholder gains from merger, Journal of Financial Economics 6, 365–383. 
 
Li, Xiafei, and Di Luo, 2016. Investor sentiment, limited arbitrage, and the cash holding effect, 
Review of Finance, forthcoming. 
Li, Dongmei, and Lu Zhang, 2010. Does q-theory with investment frictions explain anomalies in 
the cross-section of returns? Journal of Financial Economics 98, 297–314. 
 
Lintner, John, 1965. The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock 
portfolios and capital budgets, Review of Economics and Statistics 47, 13–37. 
 
Lipson, Marc L., Sandra Mortal, and Michael J. Schill, 2011. On the scope and drivers of the asset 
growth effect, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, 1651–1682. 
 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, and Wenlan Qian, 2016. How constraining are limits to arbitrage? Review 
of Financial Studies 29, 1975–2028. 
 
Lyandres, Evgeny, Le Sun, and Lu Zhang, 2008. The new issues puzzle: testing the investment-based 
explanation, Review of Financial Studies 21, 2825–2855. 
 
Mashruwala, Christina A., Shivaram Rajgopal, and Terry J. Shevlin, 2006. Why is the accrual 
anomaly not arbitraged away? The role of idiosyncratic risk and transaction costs, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 42, 3–33. 
 
McLean, R. David, 2010. Idiosyncratic risk, long-term reversal, and momentum, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45, 883–906. 
 
McLean, R. David, and Jeffrey Pontiff, 2016. Does academic research destroy stock return 
predictability? Journal of Finance 71, 5–31. 
 
Nagel, Stefan, 2005. Short sales, institutional investors, and the cross-section of stock returns, 
Journal of Financial Economics 78, 277–309.  
 
Newey, Whitney K., and Kenneth D. West, 1987. A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, Econometrica 55, 703–708. 
 
Novy-Marx, Robert, 2013. The other side of value: the gross profitability premium, Journal of 
Financial Economics 108, 1–28. 
 
Novy-Marx, Robert, and Mihail Velikov, 2016. A taxonomy of anomalies and their trading costs, 
Review of Financial Studies 29, 104–147. 
 
 39 
Ohlson, James A., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy, Journal of 
Accounting Research 18, 109–13. 
 
Ohlson, James A., 1995. Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation, Contemporary 
Accounting Research 11, 661–687. 
 
Polk, Christopher, and Paolo Sapienza, 2009. The stock market and corporate investment: a test of 
catering theory, Review of Financial Studies 22, 187–217. 
 
Pontiff, Jeffrey, 1996. Costly arbitrage: evidence from closed-end funds, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 111, 1135–1151. 
 
Pontiff, Jeffrey, 2006. Costly arbitrage and the myth of idiosyncratic risk, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 42, 35–52. 
 
Pontiff, Jeffrey, and Artemiza Woodgate, 2008. Share issuance and cross-sectional returns, Journal 
of Finance 63, 921–945. 
 
Scott, A. J., and M., Knott, 1974. A cluster analysis method for grouping means in the analysis of 
variance, Biometrics 30, 507–512. 
 
Sharpe, William F., 1964. Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under conditions of 
risk, Journal of Finance 19, 425–442. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997. The limits of arbitrage, Journal of Finance 52, 35–
55. 
 
Shumway, Tyler, 1997. The delisting bias in CRSP data, Journal of Finance 52, 327–340. 
 
Shumway, Tyler, and Vincent A. Warther, 1999. The delisting bias in CRSP’s Nasdaq data and its 
implications for the size effect, Journal of Finance 54, 2361–2379. 
 
Sloan, Richard G., 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about 
future earnings, The Accounting Review 3, 289–315. 
 
Stambaugh, Robert F., Jianfeng Yu, and Yu Yuan, 2012. The short of it: investor sentiment and 
anomalies, Journal of Financial Economics 104, 288–302.  
 
Stambaugh, Robert F., Jianfeng Yu, and Yu Yuan, 2015. Arbitrage asymmetry and the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, Journal of Finance 70, 1903–1948. 
 
Titman, Sheridan, K.C. John Wei, and Feixue Xie, 2004. Capital investments and stock returns, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39, 677–700. 
 
Titman, Sheridan, K.C. John Wei, and Feixue Xie, 2013. Market development and the asset growth 
effect: international evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, 1405–1432. 
 40 
 
Watanabe, Akiko, Yan Xu, Tong Yao, and Tong Yu, 2013. The asset growth effect: insights from 
international equity markets, Journal of Financial Economics 108, 529–563. 
 
Wurgler, Jeffrey A., and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2002. Does arbitrage flatten demand curves for 
stocks? Journal of Business 75, 583–607. 
 
Xing, Yuhang, 2008. Interpreting the value effect through the q-theory: an empirical investigation, 
Review of Financial Studies 21, 1767–1795. 
 
Yan, Xuemin (Sterling), and Lingling Zheng, 2017, Fundamental analysis and the cross-section of 
stock returns: A data-mining approach, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming. 
 
Zhang, X. Frank, 2006. Information uncertainty and stock returns, Journal of Finance 61, 105–
136. 
41 
Appendix. Variable definitions 
 
The individual arbitrage costs measures 
 
IVOL: Idiosyncratic stock return volatility, which is the standard deviation of residuals 
from the market model of monthly stock returns as dependent variable and S&P 
500 return as independent variable, estimated at the end of June of calendar year t 
with a full history of 36 months of observations. Data source: CRSP. 
 
CFVOL: Cash flow volatility, measured as the standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations for fiscal years t-5, t-4, t-3, t–2, and t–1. At least three years of 
observations are required. Cash flow from operations is earnings before 
extraordinary items (item IB) minus accruals, scaled by the average of total assets 
(item AT) over fiscal year t. Accruals is change in current assets (item ACT) less 
change in cash and short-term investments (item CHE) less change in current 
liabilities (item LCT) less depreciations (item DP) plus change in debt included in 
current liabilities (item DLC) plus change in income taxes payable (item TXP) from 
fiscal year t–1 to fiscal year t. Data source: Compustat. 
 
DISP: Analyst earnings forecast dispersion, calculated as the latest available standard 
deviation of one-year ahead earnings forecasts on the stock from the beginning of 
January of calendar year t to the end of June of calendar year t, scaled by closing 
share price at the end of June of calendar year t. Data source: I/B/E/S and CRSP. 
 
COV: Analyst coverage, measured as the latest available number of analysts following 
the stock from the beginning of January of calendar year t to the end of June of 
calendar year t. Data source: I/B/E/S. 
 
PRICE: Closing share price, or the average of bid and ask quotes if share price is unavailable, 
at the end of June of calendar year t. Data source: CRSP. 
 
DVOL: Daily dollar trading volume, which is closing share price times the trading day’s 
share trading volume, averaged over the year at the end of June of calendar year t. 
Data source: CRSP. 
 
ILLIQ: Amihud (2002) illiquidity, measured as the time-series average of absolute value 
of daily returns scaled by the trading day’s dollar trading volume over the year at 
the end of June of calendar year t. Data source: CRSP. 
 
BIDASK: Bid-ask spread, which is calculated as 2´|(Price–(Ask+Bid)/2)|/Price at the end of 
a trading day, averaged over the year at the end of June of calendar year t. Price is 
closing share price and Ask (Bid) is the ask (bid) quote. Data source: CRSP. 
 
IO: Institutional ownership, measured as the latest available percentage of outstanding 
shares held by Vanguard 500 index fund or Dimensional Fund Advisors from the 
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beginning of January of calendar year t to the end of June of calendar year t. Data 
source: Thompson Reuters (13F) Institutional Holdings and CRSP. 
 
The individual anomaly variables 
 
TAG: Total asset growth, calculated as total assets (item AT) at the end of fiscal year t–1 
minus total assets at the end of fiscal year t–2, scaled by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year t–2. Data source: Compustat. 
 
I/A: Investment-to-asset ratio, calculated as change in the sum of inventories (item 
INVT) and gross property, plant, and equipment (item PPEGT) from fiscal year t–
2 to fiscal year t–1, scaled by total assets (item AT) at the end of fiscal year t-2. 
Data source: Compustat. 
 
NOA: Net operating assets, calculated as the difference between operating assets and 
operating liabilities at the end of fiscal year t-1 scaled by total assets (item AT) at 
the end of fiscal year t-2. Operating assets is total assets minus cash and short-term 
investments (item CHE). Operating liabilities is total assets less current liabilities 
(item DLC), long-term debt (item DLTT), minority interests (item MIB), preferred 
stocks (item PSTK), and common equity (item CEQ). Data source: Compustat. 
 
OA: Operating accruals, calculated as change in current assets (Compustat item ACT) 
less change in cash and short-term investments (item CHE) less change in current 
liabilities (item LCT) less depreciations (item DP) plus change in debt included in 
current liabilities (item DLC) plus change in income taxes payable (item TXP) from 
fiscal year t–2 to fiscal year t–1, scaled by the average of total assets (item AT) over 
the year. Data source: Compustat. 
 
NSI: Net share issuance, calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of split-adjusted 
shares outstanding (item CSHO multiplied by item ADJEX_C) at the end of fiscal 
year t-1 to that at end of fiscal year t-2. Data source: Compustat. 
 
CEI: Composite equity issuance, calculated as the difference between continuously 
compounded growth in market equity from the end of June of calendar year t–5 to 
the end of June of calendar year t and continuously compounded growth in share 
price from the end of June of calendar year t–5 to the end of June of calendar year 
t. Data source: CRSP. 
 
O-score: Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy score, calculated as 
O-score = -4.07×Ln(A) + 6.03×(L/A) - 1.43×(CA-CL)/A + 0.0757×CL/CA       
                 -2.37×NI/A + 0.285×Loss - 1.72×NegBook - 0.521×ΔNI - 1.83×Op/L, 
where Ln(A) is natural logarithm of total assets (item AT), L is total liabilities (item 
LT), A is total assets (item AT), CA is current assets (item ACT), and CL is current 
liabilities (item LCT) at the end of fiscal year t–1. NI is net income (item NI) for 
fiscal year t–1. Loss is equal to one if net income (item NI) for fiscal year t–1 and 
net income (item NI) for fiscal year t–2 are negative and zero otherwise. NegBook 
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is equal to one if L is greater than A and zero otherwise. ΔNI is change in net income 
(item NI) from fiscal year t–2 to fiscal year t–1, scaled by the sum of the absolute 
values of the net income (item NI) over the two years. Op, funds from operations, 
is income before extraordinary items (item IB) plus income statement deferred tax 
(item TXDI), if available, plus equity’s share of depreciation expenses for fiscal 
year t–1, which is depreciation expenses (item DP) multiplied by market equity and 
divided by total assets (item AT) minus book value of equity plus market equity at 
the end of fiscal year t–1. Book equity is total assets (item AT) minus liabilities 
(item LT), plus balance sheet deferred taxes (item TXDB) and investment tax 
credits (item ITCI), minus preferred stock liquidation value (item PSTKL) if 
available, or redemption value (item PSTKRV) if available, or carrying value (item 
PSTK) if available. Market equity is closing share price times number of shares 
outstanding. Data source: Compustat and CRSP. 
 
GP: Gross profitability, measured as gross profit (item GP) for fiscal year t–1 scaled by 
total assets (item AT) at the end of fiscal year t–1. Data source: Compustat. 
 
OP: Operating profitability, measured as gross profit (item GP) less selling and general 
administrative expenditures (item XSGA) plus R&D expenditures (item XRD) for 
fiscal year t–1, scaled by total assets (item AT) at end of fiscal year t–1. Data source: 
Compustat. 
 
PRET: Prior-year stock return, calculated as monthly stock return continuously 
compounded from the end of June of calendar year t–1 to the end of May of calendar 
year t. Data source: CRSP. 
 
Control variables in Fama-MacBeth regressions 
 
BETA: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) beta, which is the slope of the time-series 
regression of monthly stock return in excess of the risk-free rate as dependent 
variable and the monthly market premium as independent variable, estimated at the 
end of June of calendar year t with a full history of 36 months of observations. Data 
source: CRSP and Kenneth French Data Library. 
 
ME: Market equity, calculated as closing share price times number of shares outstanding 
at the end of June of calendar year t. Data source: CRSP. 
 
B/M:  Book-to-market equity ratio, calculated as book value of equity at the end of fiscal 
year t–1 divided by market equity at the end of calendar year t–1. Book equity is 
total assets (item AT) minus liabilities (item LT), plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
(item TXDB) and investment tax credits (item ITCI), minus preferred stock 
liquidation value (item PSTKL) if available, or redemption value (item PSTKRV) 
if available, or carrying value (item PSTK) if available. Market equity is closing 
share price times number of shares outstanding. Data source: Compustat and CRSP. 
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Figure 1. 5-year moving average of annualized alphas of value-weighted long-short MISPRICE-score portfolios in extreme ARBCOST-score quintiles 
 
This figure presents 5-year moving average of annualized Fama-French three-factor alphas of long-short MISPRICE-score portfolios in the low (ARBCOST-
score1) and high (ARBCOST-score5) ARBCOST-score quintiles. The sample period is from the end of June of 1963 to the end of December of 2015. 
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Alpha (%) 
 
 
Figure 2. 5-year moving average of annualized alphas of long-short value-weighted ARBCOST-score portfolios in extreme MISPRICE-score quintiles 
 
This figure presents 5-year moving average of annualized Fama-French three-factor alphas of high-minus-low ARBCOST-score portfolios in the first 
(OVERPRICE) and fifth (UNDERPRICE) MISPRICE-score quintiles. The sample period is from the end of June of 1963 to the end of December of 2015. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics and sample correlations 
 
Panel A reports average cross-sectional mean (MEAN), standard deviation (SD), minimum (MIN), 25%/50%/75% 
percentiles (P25/P50/P75), and maximum (MAX) of the variables. N is the total number of firms. Panel B reports 
average cross-sectional correlations between arbitrage costs variables and the composite mispricing score. 
ARBCOST-score is the overall arbitrage costs score, which is the average of decile rankings of nine arbitrage costs 
measures, whichever is available. ARBRISK is arbitrage risk, which is the decile ranking of idiosyncratic stock return 
volatility (IVOL). INFO-score is the information uncertainty score, which is the average of decile rankings of cash 
flow volatility (CFVOL), analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP), and analyst coverage (COV), whichever is 
available. TCOST-score is the transaction costs score, which is the average of decile rankings of stock price (PRICE), 
dollar trading volume (DVOL), the Amihud (2002) illiquidity (ILLIQ), bid-ask spread (BIDASK), and institutional 
ownership (IO), whichever is available. PC1, PC2, and PC3 are the first, second, and third time-varying principal 
components of arbitrage costs. MISPRICE-score is the composite mispricing score, which is the average of decile 
rankings of total asset growth (TAG), investment-to-assets ratio (I/A), net operating assets (NOA), operating accruals 
(OA), net share issuance (NSI), composite equity issuance (CEI), Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy score (O-score), gross 
profitability (GP), operating profitability (OP), and prior-year stock return (PRET), whichever is available. CAPM 
beta (BETA), market equity (ME), and book-to-market equity ratio (B/M) are controls in Fama-MacBeth regressions. 
The Appendix defines the variables in detail. The sample period is from fiscal year 1962 to fiscal year 2014. The 
principal components are extracted from nine arbitrage costs measures at the end of June between 1983 and 2015. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
 MEAN SD MIN P25 P50 P75 MAX N 
ARBCOST-score 5.498 1.420 2.040 4.454 5.530 6.566 8.878 107,926 
ARBRISK 5.500 2.872 1.000 3.000 5.708 8.000 10.000 107,926 
INFO-score 5.491 1.331 2.208 4.544 5.588 6.487 7.981 107,926 
TCOST-score 5.503 1.689 1.906 4.228 5.434 6.762 9.536 107,926 
PC1 0.000 1.680 -11.141 -1.110 -0.034 1.082 7.851 44,013 
PC2 0.000 1.214 -3.971 -0.724 -0.137 0.546 11.604 44,013 
PC3 0.000 1.014 -8.193 -0.303 -0.975 0.238 13.765 44,013 
IVOL 0.104 0.052 0.024 0.069 0.094 0.127 0.734 107,926 
CFVOL 0.072 0.161 0.002 0.031 0.052 0.086 5.150 97,921 
DISP (%) 0.796 3.382 0.000 0.051 0.180 0.522 45.564 47,331 
COV 5.572 7.388 0.000 0.000 2.530 8.500 43.121 76,417 
PRICE 26.944 30.332 5.095 12.342 21.096 33.981 781.980 107,926 
DVOL (108) 14.460 52.633 0.001 0.471 2.388 10.155 1464.753 102,405 
ILLIQ (10-9) 10.092 37.645 0.004 0.332 1.573 6.947 938.451 102,405 
BIDASK (%) 1.724 0.850 0.083 1.055 1.615 2.230 6.641 107,926 
IO (%) 1.593 1.975 0.000 0.202 0.686 2.144 10.093 81,134 
MISPRICE-score 5.501 1.273 1.892 4.583 5.442 6.365 9.408 107,926 
TAG 0.166 0.472 -0.644 0.015 0.085 0.192 12.083 107,505 
I/A 0.099 0.230 -0.913 0.022 0.067 0.132 5.574 104,771 
NOA 0.720 0.362 -0.922 0.579 0.715 0.832 8.044 95,845 
OA -0.025 0.082 -0.638 -0.065 -0.029 0.011 0.642 102,843 
NSI 0.027 0.147 -1.465 -0.003 0.005 0.024 2.085 107,348 
CEI 0.376 0.539 -2.436 0.009 0.235 0.664 3.241 94,344 
O-score 0.801 5.259 0.000 0.026 0.084 0.243 78.170 104,539 
GP 0.381 0.263 -0.859 0.202 0.343 0.507 2.277 107,837 
OP 0.162 0.105 -0.666 0.106 0.153 0.213 0.908 107,822 
PRET 0.166 0.811 -0.778 -0.124 0.061 0.293 20.520 107,926 
BETA 1.160 0.682 -1.498 0.694 1.084 1.539 5.089 107,926 
ME (109) 2.218 8.757 0.004 0.112 0.347 1.218 183.836 107,926 
B/M 0.855 0.848 0.019 0.437 0.709 1.063 17.894 107,926 
 
47 
Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Sample correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) MISPRICE-score                 
(2) ARBCOST-score -0.06                
(3) ARBRISK -0.08 0.73               
(4) INFO-score -0.04 0.67 0.42              
(5) TCOST-score -0.06 0.93 0.56 0.42             
(6) PC1 -0.15 0.88 0.76 0.66 0.81            
(7) PC2 -0.05 0.11 0.35 0.18 -0.05 0.00           
(8) PC3 0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00          
(9) IVOL -0.08 0.65 0.87 0.37 0.50 0.75 0.43 0.05         
(10) CFVOL -0.06 0.44 0.36 0.61 0.27 0.50 0.41 0.11 0.38        
(11) DISP -0.09 0.21 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.21 0.30 -0.51 0.15 0.09       
(12) COV -0.02 -0.60 -0.27 -0.58 -0.54 -0.67 0.48 0.06 -0.23 -0.14 -0.03      
(13) PRICE 0.11 -0.54 -0.33 -0.25 -0.57 -0.64 0.18 0.07 -0.29 -0.15 -0.11 0.29     
(14) DVOL 0.04 -0.35 -0.16 -0.16 -0.40 -0.48 0.55 0.28 -0.13 -0.07 -0.03 0.44 0.38    
(15) ILLIQ 0.07 0.35 0.17 0.14 0.39 0.25 -0.18 0.47 0.19 0.10 -0.01 -0.14 -0.20 -0.11   
(16) BIDASK -0.11 0.54 0.59 0.26 0.50 0.74 0.40 0.06 0.56 0.24 0.17 -0.16 -0.24 -0.06 0.01  
(17) IO 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.40 -0.40 0.20 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.28 -0.16 -0.12 0.00 0.12 
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Table 2: Monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas (%) of value-weighted portfolios sorted by MISPRICE-score or anomaly variable 
 
Stocks are sorted into quintiles at the end of June each year. Portfolios are held until the end of June next year. Firms that are overpriced/underpriced are those in 
the first/fifth quintile. Long-short is the trading strategy which longs the underpriced portfolio and shorts the overpriced portfolio. The sample is from 07/1963 to 
12/2015. Newey-West t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 MISPRICE-score TAG I/A NOA OA NSI CEI O-score GP OP PRET 
Overpriced -0.41 -0.03 -0.15 -0.24 -0.21 -0.21 0.01 -0.16 -0.17 -0.33 -0.11 
 (-4.73) (-0.45) (-1.82) (-3.40) (-2.69) (-2.62) (0.24) (-1.75) (-2.53) (-3.95) (-1.22) 
2 -0.15 0.14 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 0.11 0.08 -0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.05 
 (-2.39) (2.62) (0.82) (-2.18) (-0.17) (1.79) (1.44) (-0.17) (-1.31) (-2.18) (-0.83) 
3 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.01 
 (1.97) (1.01) (1.92) (3.12) (2.87) (1.41) (-0.57) (0.37) (0.73) (0.25) (-0.23) 
4 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.14 
 (3.35) (1.54) (2.68) (3.19) (2.28) (1.63) (1.35) (1.05) (1.25) (1.40) (2.35) 
Underpriced 0.25 0.10 0.11 0.24 0.10 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.35 0.23 0.27 
 (4.39) (1.21) (1.68) (3.75) (1.32) (2.76) (1.74) (2.45) (4.44) (4.40) (2.94) 
Long-short 0.66 0.13 0.26 0.49 0.31 0.37 0.12 0.30 0.51 0.56 0.38 
 (5.58) (1.21) (2.59) (4.56) (2.71) (3.32) (1.25) (2.54) (4.19) (4.86) (2.81) 
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Table 3. The impact of overall arbitrage costs on mispricing 
 
This table reports monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas (%) for 25 value-weighted portfolios independently sorted 
by ARBCOST-score and MISPRICE-score. Firms subject to low/high arbitrage costs are those in the first/fifth quintile. 
Long-short is the trading strategy which longs the underpriced portfolio and shorts the overpriced portfolio. High-low 
is the trading strategy which longs the high arbitrage costs portfolio and shorts the low arbitrage costs portfolio. The 
sample period is from 07/1963 to 12/2015. Newey-West t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
MISPRICE-score High costs 4 3 2 Low costs High-low 
Overpriced -0.92 -0.97 -0.65 -0.45 -0.19 -0.73 
 (-7.14) (-5.79) (-4.29) (-3.41) (-2.28) (-4.74) 
2 -0.47 -0.16 0.15 -0.23 -0.14 -0.33 
 (-2.98) (-1.44) (1.37) (-2.46) (-1.76) (-2.03) 
3 -0.21 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.10 -0.31 
 (-1.52) (0.02) (1.19) (0.62) (1.97) (-2.08) 
4 -0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.14 0.19 -0.23 
 (-0.31) (-0.08) (1.61) (1.12) (3.09) (-1.53) 
Underpriced 0.35 0.18 0.47 0.17 0.25 0.10 
 (2.47) (1.61) (3.06) (1.60) (3.73) (0.73) 
Long-short 1.27 1.15 1.12 0.62 0.44 0.83 
 (6.52) (5.68) (4.58) (3.32) (4.38) (4.50) 
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Table 4. The impact of arbitrage risk, information uncertainty, and transaction costs on mispricing 
 
This table reports monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas (%) for 25 value-weighted portfolios independently sorted 
by ARBRISK, INFO-score, or TCOST-score and MISPRICE-score. Long-short is the trading strategy which longs 
the underpriced portfolio and shorts the overpriced portfolio. High-low is the trading strategy which longs the high 
arbitrage costs portfolio and shorts the low arbitrage costs portfolio. The sample period is from 07/1963 to 12/2015. 
Newey-West t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: Arbitrage risk (ARBRISK) 
MISPRICE-score High costs 4 3 2 Low costs High-low 
Overpriced -0.95 -0.76 -0.51 -0.22 -0.11 -0.84 
 (-6.69) (-3.84) (-3.09) (-1.91) (-1.21) (-4.95) 
2 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.15 -0.21 0.25 
 (0.21) (0.06) (-0.52) (-1.28) (-2.26) (1.15) 
3 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.08 -0.02 
 (0.30) (0.84) (0.94) (1.05) (1.13) (-0.11) 
4 -0.02 0.48 0.27 0.21 0.09 -0.10 
 (-0.08) (2.56) (2.08) (2.35) (1.14) (-0.44) 
Underpriced 0.29 0.35 0.21 0.34 0.21 0.08 
 (1.41) (2.24) (1.56) (3.61) (2.51) (0.34) 
Long-short 1.24 1.10 0.72 0.56 0.32 0.92 
 (5.36) (4.26) (3.03) (3.55) (3.16) (4.08) 
 
Panel B: Information uncertainty (INFO-score) 
MISPRICE-score High costs 4 3 2 Low costs High-low 
Overpriced -0.95 -0.56 -0.43 -0.22 -0.35 -0.60 
 (-5.76) (-3.61) (-2.70) (-1.77) (-3.46) (-3.41) 
2 -0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.15 -0.11 -0.02 
 (-0.92) (0.00) (-1.13) (-1.32) (-1.13) (-0.09) 
3 0.16 -0.17 -0.03 0.04 0.17 -0.01 
 (0.99) (-1.21) (-0.28) (0.50) (2.49) (-0.05) 
4 -0.19 0.30 -0.03 0.14 0.16 -0.35 
 (-1.22) (1.98) (-0.29) (1.54) (2.13) (-1.91) 
Underpriced 0.25 0.33 0.14 0.24 0.30 -0.05 
 (1.65) (2.64) (1.16) (2.42) (4.35) (-0.33) 
Long-short 1.20 0.88 0.57 0.46 0.65 0.55 
 (5.02) (3.88) (2.67) (2.81) (5.07) (2.26) 
 
Panel C: Transaction costs (TCOST-score) 
MISPRICE-score High costs 4 3 2 Low costs High-low 
Overpriced -0.80 -0.63 -0.50 -0.46 -0.32 -0.48 
 (-6.82) (-4.96) (-3.61) (-3.83) (-3.39) (-4.13) 
2 -0.24 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 -0.15 -0.09 
 (-2.12) (-1.04) (-0.04) (-1.51) (-1.98) (-0.79) 
3 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.11 0.11 -0.19 
 (-0.77) (-0.34) (0.58) (1.07) (2.11) (-1.61) 
4 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.19 -0.12 
 (0.55) (1.46) (1.70) (1.18) (3.09) (-0.95) 
Underpriced 0.36 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.13 
 (2.96) (1.98) (2.77) (3.24) (3.89) (0.94) 
Long-short 1.16 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.56 0.61 
 (7.41) (5.37) (4.78) (4.77) (4.54) (3.84) 
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Table 5. Fama-MacBeth regressions: Mispricing, overall arbitrage costs, arbitrage risk, information uncertainty, and transaction costs 
 
This table reports regressions of monthly returns on MISPRICE-score and MISPRICE-score interacted with ARBCOST-score, ARBRISK, INFO-score, and 
TCOST-score. Cross-sectional regressions are estimated with OLS (Panel A) or WLS that weighs an observation by its prior-month market equity (Panel B). Slopes 
are multiplied by 10. The sample period is from 07/1963 to 12/2015. Newey-West t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MISPRICE-score 2.183 -0.556 0.614 0.023 0.284 -0.559 
 (9.28) (-1.09) (2.44) (0.05) (0.66) (-1.06) 
MISPRICE-score × ARBCOST-score  0.476     
  (4.91)     
MISPRICE-score × ARBRISK   0.264   0.177 
   (4.94)   (3.22) 
MISPRICE-score × INFO-score    0.383  0.173 
    (4.50)  (2.22) 
MISPRICE-score × TCOST-score     0.332 0.125 
     (4.40) (1.68) 
ARBCOST-score  -3.165     
  (-4.15)     
ARBRISK   -1.472   -0.877 
   (-3.98)   (-2.38) 
INFO-score    -2.866  -1.722 
    (-4.97)  (-3.45) 
TCOST-score     -1.885 -0.668 
     (-3.77) (-1.43) 
BETA 0.717 0.961 0.707 1.008 0.756 0.814 
 (0.68) (1.03) (0.93) (0.98) (0.74) (1.09) 
ME -0.528 -0.896 -0.510 -0.843 -0.507 -0.679 
 (-1.55) (-3.11) (-1.82) (-2.62) (-1.53) (-2.26) 
B/M 2.082 1.807 1.844 1.880 1.951 1.754 
 (3.41) (2.99) (3.29) (3.12) (3.21) (3.16) 
Adjusted R2 4.05% 4.55% 4.85% 4.22% 4.35% 5.13% 
Number of firm-month 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: WLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MISPRICE-score 1.434 0.127 0.607 1.401 0.165 1.305 
 (5.38) (0.20) (1.76) (1.85) (0.27) (1.70) 
MISPRICE-score × ARBCOST-score  0.355     
  (2.39)     
MISPRICE-score × ARBRISK   0.245   0.216 
   (2.80)   (2.15) 
MISPRICE-score × INFO-score    0.038  -0.183 
    (0.26)  (-1.30) 
MISPRICE-score × TCOST-score     0.375 0.084 
     (2.58) (0.52) 
ARBCOST-score  -2.333     
  (-2.51)     
ARBRISK   -1.162   -0.812 
   (-2.38)   (-1.42) 
INFO-score    -0.593  0.644 
    (-0.65)  (0.78) 
TCOST-score     -2.483 -1.186 
     (-2.98) (-1.21) 
BETA 0.159 0.248 -0.147 0.303 0.261 -0.153 
 (0.11) (0.25) (-0.12) (0.21) (0.19) (-0.13) 
ME -0.737 -0.902 -0.602 -0.854 -0.892 -0.903 
 (-2.55) (-2.69) (-1.84) (-2.92) (-2.53) (-2.47) 
B/M 0.848 0.758 0.712 0.755 0.761 0.686 
 (1.17) (1.04) (0.97) (1.0045) (1.06) (0.96) 
Adjusted R2 9.69% 11.00% 11.32% 10.94% 10.60% 13.11% 
Number of firm-month 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 1,255,049 
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Table 6. Time-varying principal components of arbitrage costs 
 
Panel A presents year-by-year, average, and cumulative (starting from PC1) percentages of total variance explained 
by each of the nine principal components (PC1 to PC9). Panel B presents year-by-year and average eigenvalues of 
each principal component. Panel C presents average eigenvectors of the first, second, and third principal components. 
The principal components are extracted from nine arbitrage costs measures at the end of June between 1983 and 2015. 
 
Panel A: Proportions of total variance explained by a principal component 
Year PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 
1983 28% 15% 13% 11% 10% 8% 7% 6% 4% 
1984 29% 16% 11% 11% 10% 8% 6% 5% 4% 
1985 31% 15% 11% 11% 10% 9% 6% 4% 3% 
1986 33% 15% 11% 10% 10% 9% 6% 4% 3% 
1987 33% 16% 11% 10% 9% 8% 6% 4% 3% 
1988 35% 14% 11% 10% 9% 8% 6% 3% 3% 
1989 36% 14% 11% 10% 8% 8% 6% 4% 3% 
1990 34% 15% 11% 10% 9% 8% 6% 4% 3% 
1991 35% 15% 11% 10% 8% 8% 6% 3% 3% 
1992 35% 15% 11% 10% 9% 7% 6% 3% 3% 
1993 34% 15% 11% 10% 9% 8% 6% 4% 3% 
1994 35% 15% 11% 11% 8% 7% 6% 4% 3% 
1995 36% 15% 11% 11% 8% 7% 5% 4% 3% 
1996 34% 16% 11% 11% 8% 7% 6% 4% 2% 
1997 33% 16% 11% 11% 9% 7% 6% 5% 2% 
1998 31% 18% 11% 11% 10% 7% 6% 4% 2% 
1999 31% 18% 11% 11% 9% 7% 6% 4% 2% 
2000 26% 21% 11% 11% 10% 8% 7% 5% 2% 
2001 26% 21% 11% 11% 9% 8% 7% 4% 2% 
2002 28% 19% 11% 11% 10% 8% 7% 4% 2% 
2003 28% 18% 11% 11% 10% 8% 7% 4% 3% 
2004 30% 16% 11% 11% 10% 8% 7% 4% 2% 
2005 30% 16% 11% 11% 10% 8% 7% 4% 3% 
2006 29% 16% 11% 11% 10% 8% 8% 4% 3% 
2007 30% 15% 11% 11% 10% 8% 7% 5% 3% 
2008 27% 14% 11% 11% 11% 10% 8% 5% 3% 
2009 29% 14% 11% 11% 11% 9% 7% 5% 3% 
2010 31% 16% 12% 10% 9% 7% 6% 5% 4% 
2011 30% 15% 11% 11% 10% 7% 6% 5% 4% 
2012 30% 16% 12% 11% 10% 7% 6% 5% 3% 
2013 30% 17% 11% 11% 10% 7% 7% 5% 2% 
2014 31% 18% 11% 10% 10% 8% 6% 5% 2% 
2015 32% 18% 11% 10% 9% 8% 5% 5% 2% 
Average 31% 16% 11% 11% 10% 8% 6% 4% 3% 
Cumulative 31% 47% 59% 69% 79% 87% 93% 97% 100% 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Eigenvalues of a principal component 
Year PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 
1983 2.53 1.35 1.13 1.01 0.86 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.32 
1984 2.64 1.44 1.00 0.96 0.93 0.73 0.51 0.43 0.34 
1985 2.77 1.33 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.82 0.52 0.40 0.31 
1986 2.97 1.34 1.00 0.92 0.86 0.79 0.51 0.36 0.26 
1987 2.99 1.41 1.00 0.92 0.84 0.74 0.50 0.35 0.26 
1988 3.11 1.30 1.00 0.91 0.81 0.76 0.54 0.31 0.25 
1989 3.22 1.24 1.00 0.94 0.74 0.70 0.53 0.33 0.29 
1990 3.06 1.33 1.01 0.93 0.80 0.70 0.56 0.33 0.27 
1991 3.16 1.32 1.01 0.94 0.75 0.69 0.54 0.31 0.27 
1992 3.14 1.39 1.01 0.94 0.77 0.65 0.54 0.28 0.27 
1993 3.08 1.32 1.01 0.94 0.83 0.68 0.54 0.32 0.28 
1994 3.15 1.33 1.01 0.96 0.76 0.67 0.53 0.32 0.28 
1995 3.21 1.35 1.01 0.95 0.74 0.66 0.48 0.33 0.28 
1996 3.06 1.45 1.02 0.99 0.74 0.65 0.50 0.36 0.22 
1997 2.95 1.46 1.00 0.98 0.83 0.65 0.50 0.41 0.21 
1998 2.82 1.58 1.01 0.98 0.86 0.66 0.54 0.36 0.20 
1999 2.75 1.64 1.02 0.96 0.81 0.64 0.57 0.40 0.19 
2000 2.32 1.91 1.00 0.96 0.87 0.73 0.63 0.43 0.14 
2001 2.34 1.89 1.02 1.00 0.85 0.68 0.64 0.39 0.20 
2002 2.50 1.70 1.02 0.97 0.90 0.69 0.60 0.39 0.22 
2003 2.53 1.59 1.01 0.97 0.92 0.73 0.62 0.38 0.25 
2004 2.68 1.46 1.01 0.98 0.93 0.73 0.59 0.40 0.20 
2005 2.67 1.46 1.01 0.99 0.94 0.70 0.59 0.40 0.24 
2006 2.63 1.41 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.73 0.70 0.39 0.27 
2007 2.71 1.39 1.01 1.00 0.88 0.69 0.65 0.42 0.26 
2008 2.47 1.26 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.87 0.69 0.45 0.26 
2009 2.60 1.22 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.83 0.64 0.41 0.28 
2010 2.75 1.44 1.05 0.93 0.85 0.67 0.54 0.41 0.36 
2011 2.69 1.38 1.01 0.98 0.92 0.64 0.56 0.43 0.40 
2012 2.71 1.46 1.05 0.95 0.94 0.61 0.57 0.42 0.28 
2013 2.74 1.51 1.01 0.95 0.93 0.64 0.59 0.47 0.17 
2014 2.80 1.61 1.00 0.92 0.86 0.69 0.53 0.44 0.16 
2015 2.88 1.61 1.02 0.91 0.80 0.69 0.49 0.42 0.18 
Average 2.81 1.45 1.02 0.96 0.86 0.70 0.57 0.39 0.25 
 
Panel C: Average eigenvectors of the first, second, and third principal components 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 
IVOL 0.45 0.38 -0.01 
CFVOL 0.30 0.37 0.02 
DISP 0.05 0.09 0.42 
COV -0.41 0.39 -0.01 
PRICE -0.39 0.15 0.00 
DVOL -0.29 0.47 0.02 
ILLIQ 0.15 -0.14 0.16 
BIDASK 0.44 0.35 0.01 
IO 0.25 -0.31 -0.02 
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Table 7. The impact of time-varying principal components of arbitrage costs on mispricing 
 
This table reports monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas (%) for 25 value-weighted portfolios independently sorted 
by the first, second, or third principal component of arbitrage costs (PC1, PC2, or PC3) and MISPRICE-score. The 
principal components are extracted from nine arbitrage costs measures at the end of June between 1983 and 2015. 
Long-short is the trading strategy which longs the underpriced portfolio and shorts the overpriced portfolio. High-low 
is the trading strategy which longs the high arbitrage costs portfolio and shorts the low arbitrage costs portfolio. The 
sample period is from 07/1983 to 12/2015. Newey-West t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: First principal component of arbitrage costs (PC1) 
MISPRICE-score High costs 4 3 2 Low costs High-low 
Overpriced -1.39 -0.92 -0.60 -0.40 -0.23 -1.16 
 (-4.82) (-3.88) (-2.76) (-1.95) (-1.95) (-4.02) 
2 -0.62 -0.23 0.14 0.02 -0.34 -0.28 
 (-2.84) (-1.40) (0.90) (0.20) (-1.90) (-1.05) 
3 -0.04 -0.05 0.33 0.04 0.24 -0.28 
 (-0.19) (-0.20) (2.01) (0.29) (3.16) (-1.37) 
4 -0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.19 
 (-0.45) (-0.27) (0.28) (0.59) (1.40) (-0.84) 
Underpriced 0.83 0.07 0.23 0.14 0.30 0.54 
 (3.57) (0.36) (1.55) (1.28) (3.29) (2.30) 
Long-short 2.22 0.99 0.83 0.54 0.52 1.70 
 (5.26) (3.39) (3.29) (2.26) (3.56) (4.28) 
 
Panel B: Second principal component of arbitrage costs (PC2) 
MISPRICE-score High costs 4 3 2 Low costs High-low 
Overpriced -0.74 -0.44 -0.20 0.08 0.14 -0.88 
 (-4.18) (-2.49) (-1.10) (0.64) (1.03) (-3.84) 
2 -0.46 -0.07 -0.03 0.15 0.29 -0.74 
 (-2.29) (-0.55) (-0.28) (1.13) (2.69) (-3.13) 
3 0.20 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.25 -0.05 
 (1.38) (0.63) (1.16) (2.35) (2.13) (-0.23) 
4 0.06 0.04 0.26 0.27 0.21 -0.16 
 (0.62) (0.37) (2.44) (2.15) (1.88) (-1.17) 
Underpriced 0.31 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.34 -0.03 
 (2.69) (1.65) (1.74) (2.54) (1.96) (-0.18) 
Long-short 1.05 0.60 0.46 0.28 0.20 0.85 
 (5.03) (3.15) (2.76) (2.10) (1.08) (3.66) 
 
Panel C: Third principal component of arbitrage costs (PC3) 
MISPRICE-score High costs 4 3 2 Low costs High-low 
1: Overpriced 0.02 -0.27 -0.55 -0.37 -0.95 0.97 
 (0.10) (-1.38) (-3.56) (-2.14) (-4.17) (3.59) 
2 0.27 0.10 -0.05 -0.11 -0.65 0.92 
 (1.52) (0.79) (-0.38) (-0.69) (-3.13) (3.09) 
3 0.57 0.31 0.09 0.18 -0.34 0.91 
 (3.83) (2.20) (0.63) (1.64) (-2.11) (3.62) 
4 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.39 -0.02 0.22 
 (1.52) (1.13) (1.02) (3.10) (-0.13) (1.02) 
5: Underpriced 0.41 0.36 0.20 0.28 0.05 0.35 
 (3.24) (3.23) (1.58) (2.24) (0.35) (1.87) 
Long-short 0.39 0.64 0.76 0.65 1.00 -0.62 
 (1.94) (2.66) (4.38) (3.77) (4.11) (-2.46) 
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Table 8. Fama-MacBeth regressions: Mispricing and time-varying principal components of arbitrage costs 
 
This table reports regressions of monthly returns on MISPRICE-score and MISPRICE-score interacted with deciles of the first, second, and third principal 
components of arbitrage costs (PC1_dec, PC2_dec, and PC3_dec). The principal components are extracted from nine arbitrage costs measures at the end of June 
between 1983 and 2015. The deciles are independently sorted at the end of June each year. Cross-sectional regressions in columns (1) to (5) are estimated with 
OLS and regressions in columns (6) to (10) are estimated with WLS that weighs an observation by its prior-month market equity. Slopes are multiplied by 10. The 
sample period is from 07/1983 to 12/2015. Newey-West t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
MISPRICE-score 2.300 0.329 0.684 2.314 -0.631 1.280 0.835 0.528 2.189 -0.745 
 (6.81) (0.85) (2.01) (5.03) (-1.26) (3.39) (1.73) (0.86) (3.56) (-1.00) 
MISPRICE-score × PC1_dec  0.344   0.264  0.155   0.200 
  (4.55)   (3.34)  (1.83)   (2.21) 
MISPRICE-score × PC2_dec   0.282  0.249   0.109  0.198 
   (4.59)  (4.45)   (1.17)  (2.03) 
MISPRICE-score × PC3_dec    -0.002     -0.152  
    (-0.04)     (-1.82)  
PC1_dec  -2.011   -1.457  -0.792   -1.170 
  (-4.48)   (-3.21)  (-1.45)   (-2.33) 
PC2_dec   -2.034  -1.828   -1.097  -1.523 
   (-4.97)  (-4.83)   (-1.68)  (-2.36) 
PC3_dec    0.296     1.404  
    (0.82)     (2.59)  
BETA 0.171 0.277 0.596 0.252 0.570 0.379 0.280 0.673 0.571 0.692 
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.49) (0.19) (0.49) (0.20) (0.15) (0.37) (0.31) (0.39) 
ME 0.162 0.112 0.247 0.144 0.268 -0.404 -0.346 -0.144 -0.171 -0.210 
 (0.56) (0.41) (0.80) (0.50) (0.94) (-1.04) (-0.90) (-0.35) (-0.44) (-0.53) 
B/M 1.873 1.764 1.569 1.823 1.525 0.373 0.329 0.196 0.342 0.197 
 (2.54) (2.40) (2.17) (2.52) (2.10) (0.44) (0.39) (0.23) (0.42) (0.23) 
Adjusted R2 3.21% 3.57% 3.59% 3.40% 3.84% 8.91% 9.90% 10.21% 10.01% 10.91% 
Number of firm-month 881,702 881,702 881,702 881,702 881,702 881,702 881,702 881,702 881,702 881,702 
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Table 9. Subperiod Fama-MacBeth regressions: Mispricing and nine arbitrage costs measures 
 
This table reports regressions of monthly returns on MISPRICE-score and MISPRICE-score interacted with deciles of nine arbitrage costs measures (ARBRISK, 
CFVOL_dec, DISP_dec, COV_dec, PRICE_dec, DVOL_dec, ILLIQ_dec, BIDASK_dec, and IO_dec) over three subperiods. The deciles are independently sorted 
at the end of June each year. Cross-sectional regressions are estimated either with OLS (Panels A and C) or WLS that weighs an observation by its prior-month 
market equity (Panels B and D). Slopes are multiplied by 10. Newey-West t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: MISPRICE-score regressions (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  07/1963-06/1983 07/1983-12/2004 01/2005-12/2015 
MISPRICE-score  2.019 2.951 0.835 
  (7.40) (7.91) (2.21) 
BETA  1.290 -0.066 0.704 
  (0.75) (-0.04) (0.39) 
ME  -1.518 0.241 -0.017 
  (-2.23) (0.61) (-0.05) 
B/M  2.744 2.640 0.147 
  (2.56) (2.88) (0.14) 
Adjusted R2  5.30% 3.67% 2.36% 
Number of firm-month  388,174 640,321 241,381 
 
Panel B: MISPRICE-score regressions (WLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  07/1963-06/1983 07/1983-12/2004 01/2005-12/2015 
MISPRICE-score  1.753 1.496 0.796 
  (5.37) (3.29) (1.21) 
BETA  -0.461 0.195 0.793 
  (-0.20) (0.08) (0.30) 
ME  -1.226 -0.354 -0.517 
  (-3.18) (-0.71) (-0.88) 
B/M  1.881 0.808 -0.607 
  (1.46) (0.74) (-0.51) 
Adjusted R2  10.98% 9.22% 8.22% 
Number of firm-month  388,174 640,321 241,381 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Interactive MISPRICE-score regressions (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  07/1963-06/1983 07/1983-12/2004 01/2005-12/2015 
MISPRICE-score  1.216 -1.004 -3.186 
  (2.26) (-1.30) (-2.70) 
MISPRICE-score × ARBRISK 0.016 0.348 -0.172 
  (0.19) (4.89) (-1.39) 
MISPRICE-score × CFVOL_dec 0.090 0.097 -0.077 
  (1.68) (1.82) (-0.96) 
MISPRICE-score × DISP_dec  -0.021 0.126 
   (-0.30) (1.38) 
MISPRICE-score × COV_dec  0.039 0.027 
   (0.60) (0.47) 
MISPRICE-score × PRICE_dec 0.046 0.278 0.218 
  (0.51) (2.97) (1.66) 
MISPRICE-score × DVOL_dec -0.215 -0.106 -0.799 
  (-0.88) (-0.45) (-2.02) 
MISPRICE-score × ILLIQ_dec 0.146 0.004 0.828 
  (0.57) (0.02) (1.87) 
MISPRICE-score × BIDASK_dec 0.037 -0.119 0.155 
  (0.47) (-1.48) (1.28) 
MISPRICE-score × IO_dec   0.140 0.339 
   (2.85) (4.94) 
ARBRISK  0.358 -1.917 0.948 
  (0.58) (-4.69) (1.19) 
CFVOL_dec  -0.641 -0.736 0.234 
  (-1.88) (-2.20) (0.55) 
DISP_dec   -0.589 -1.348 
   (-1.39) (-2.65) 
COV_dec   -0.372 -0.295 
   (-0.97) (-0.79) 
PRICE_dec  -0.298 -1.653 -0.970 
  (-0.47) (-2.68) (-0.95) 
DVOL_dec  2.003 1.552 4.627 
  (1.34) (1.14) (1.96) 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
ILLIQ_dec  -1.388 -0.958 -4.488 
  (-0.95) (-0.80) (-1.59) 
BIDASK_dec  -0.019 0.969 -0.998 
  (-0.04) (1.92) (-1.20) 
IO_dec   -1.021 -2.204 
   (-3.51) (-6.14) 
BETA  1.017 0.327 1.002 
  (0.89) (0.35) (0.77) 
ME  -1.061 0.173 0.417 
  (-1.46) (0.34) (0.33) 
B/M  2.354 2.274 -0.652 
  (2.50) (3.51) (-0.57) 
Adjusted R2  7.41% 5.40% 4.43% 
Number of firm-month  373,347 640,321 241,381 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Interactive MISPRICE-score regressions (WLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  07/1963-06/1983 07/1983-12/2004 01/2005-12/2015 
MISPRICE-score  1.681 -0.580 -0.391 
  (2.61) (-0.50) (-0.26) 
MISPRICE-score × ARBRISK -0.008 0.354 -0.135 
  (-0.08) (2.01) (-0.50) 
MISPRICE-score × CFVOL_dec -0.129 0.063 0.027 
  (-1.51) (0.63) (0.22) 
MISPRICE-score × DISP_dec  -0.028 0.039 
   (-0.21) (0.26) 
MISPRICE-score × COV_dec  -0.090 0.060 
   (-0.92) (0.68) 
MISPRICE-score × PRICE_dec 0.041 0.118 0.088 
  (0.26) (0.80) (0.41) 
MISPRICE-score × DVOL_dec -0.036 0.165 -0.309 
  (-0.13) (0.56) (-0.59) 
MISPRICE-score × ILLIQ_dec 0.066 -0.265 0.101 
  (0.23) (-0.90) (0.16) 
MISPRICE-score × BIDASK_dec 0.096 0.154 0.050 
  (0.87) (0.71) (0.16) 
MISPRICE-score × IO_dec   0.035 0.124 
   (0.30) (1.15) 
ARBRISK  0.218 -1.290 1.132 
  (0.31) (-1.36) (0.72) 
CFVOL_dec  0.555 -0.517 -0.169 
  (1.13) (-0.91) (-0.25) 
DISP_dec   -0.671 -0.634 
   (-0.99) (-0.67) 
COV_dec   0.900 -0.401 
   (1.43) (-0.76) 
PRICE_dec  -0.420 -0.502 -0.645 
  (-0.40) (-0.53) (-0.47) 
DVOL_dec  -0.264 -0.955 2.117 
  (-0.17) (-0.48) (0.70) 
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ILLIQ_dec  0.487 0.339 -0.926 
  (0.29) (0.19) (-0.26) 
BIDASK_dec  -0.388 -1.095 -0.921 
  (-0.62) (-0.73) (-0.46) 
IO_dec   -0.533 -0.935 
   (-0.86) (-1.64) 
BETA  -0.897 -0.564 2.002 
  (-0.46) (-0.40) (0.87) 
ME  -0.958 -0.583 -0.714 
  (-1.99) (-0.77) (-0.79) 
B/M  1.532 1.749 -0.738 
  (1.18) (1.86) (-0.75) 
Adjusted R2  16.68% 16.10% 15.92% 
Number of firm-month  373,347 640,321 241,381 
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Table 10. An empirical model of arbitrage costs versus the first and second time-varying principal components of arbitrage costs 
 
This table reports regressions of monthly returns on MISPRICE-score and MISPRICE-score interacted with deciles of arbitrage risk (ARBRISK), cash flow 
volatility (CFVOL_dec), share price (PRICE_dec), passive institutional ownership (IO_dec), and the first and second principal components of arbitrage costs 
(PC1_dec and PC2_dec) over two subperiods. The deciles are independently sorted at the end of June each year. Cross-sectional regressions are estimated with 
OLS (Panel A) or WLS that weighs an observation by its prior-month market equity (Panel B). Slopes are multiplied by 10. Newey-West t-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 07/1983-12/2004 01/2005-12/2015 07/1983-12/2004 01/2005-12/2015 07/1983-12/2004 01/2005-12/2015 
MISPRICE-score -1.687 -2.772 -0.556 -0.800 -1.990 -3.074 
 (-2.39) -(3.09) (-0.86) (-1.20) (-2.45) (-3.56) 
MISPRICE-score × ARBRISK 0.324    0.283  
 (4.36)    (3.50)  
MISPRICE-score × CFVOL_dec 0.103    0.078  
 (1.87)    (1.39)  
MISPRICE-score × PRICE_dec 0.194 0.277   0.191 0.268 
 (2.70) (2.52)   (2.77) (2.05) 
MISPRICE-score × IO_dec 0.174 0.336   0.171 0.278 
 (3.64) (5.82)   (3.51) (4.61) 
MISPRICE-score × PC1_dec   0.365 0.036 0.057 -0.013 
   (3.68) (0.42) (0.72) (-0.13) 
MISPRICE-score × PC2_dec   0.257 0.233 0.073 0.123 
   (3.72) (2.44) (0.99) (1.27) 
ARBRISK -1.783    -1.511  
 (-4.51)    (-3.51)  
CFVOL_dec -0.798    -0.624  
 (-2.35)    (-1.85)  
PRICE_dec -1.247 -1.570   -1.220 -1.407 
 (-2.59) (-1.69)   (-2.66) (-1.37) 
IO_dec -1.231 -2.211   -1.186 -1.795 
 (-4.27) (-6.51)   (-4.00) (-5.23) 
PC1_dec   -1.959 -0.328 -0.311 -0.205 
   (-3.45) (-0.56) (-0.66) (-0.31) 
PC2_dec   -1.765 -1.968 -0.593 -1.268 
   (-3.91) (-2.80) (-1.31) (-1.78) 
BETA 0.277 0.537 0.273 1.240 0.336 1.072 
 (0.26) (0.32) (0.18) (0.74) (0.32) (0.65) 
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ME -0.022 0.088 0.385 0.007 0.085 0.052 
 (-0.06) (0.29) (1.00) (0.02) (0.23) (0.17) 
B/M 1.975 -0.432 2.411 -0.466 1.968 -0.766 
 (2.73) (-0.40) (2.87) (-0.39) (2.72) (0.67) 
Adjusted R2 4.76% 2.84% 4.17% 3.07% 4.90% 3.40% 
Number of firm-month 640,321 241,381 640321 241,381 640,321 241,381 
 
Panel B: WLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 07/1983-12/2004 07/1983-12/2004 07/1983-12/2004 
MISPRICE-score -0.065 -1.314 -0.696 
 (-0.11) (-1.41) (-0.76) 
MISPRICE-score × ARBRISK 0.517  0.500 
 (3.43)  (2.56) 
MISPRICE-score × PC1_dec  0.289 -0.073 
  (2.49) (-0.48) 
MISPRICE-score × PC2_dec  0.269 0.128 
  (2.26) (1.01) 
ARBRISK -2.580  -2.269 
 (-3.50)  (-2.46) 
PC1_dec  -1.475 0.363 
  (-2.33) (0.42) 
PC2_dec  -1.860 -1.207 
  (-2.43) (-1.49) 
BETA -0.403 0.388 -0.594 
 (-0.24) (0.17) (-0.34) 
ME -0.211 -0.115 0.179 
 (-0.34) (-0.23) (0.30) 
B/M 0.710 0.628 0.680 
 (0.65) (0.58) (0.63) 
Adjusted R2 10.92% 11.10% 12.44% 
Number of firm-month 640,321 640,321 640,321 
 
 
